

★ PRESIDENTIAL SERIES ★

# PRESIDENT CARTER

AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE  
IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS



HISTORICAL  
COLLECTIONS



Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>NOV 2013</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-2013 to 00-00-2013</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Central Intelligence Agency, Information Management Services (IMS), Washington, DC, 20505</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>Same as Report (SAR)</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>33</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			



# View the Document Collection

This collection consists of more than 250 previously classified documents, totaling over 1,400 pages, including some 120 that are being released for the first time. These documents cover the period from January 1977 through March 1979 and were produced by the CIA to support the Carter administration's diplomatic efforts leading up to President Carter's negotiations with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David in September 1978. The declassified documents detail diplomatic developments from the Arab peace offensive and President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem through the regionwide aftermath of Camp David. Newly released items include:

- Two National Intelligence Estimates on Egypt and the Middle East Military Balance.
- Selections from CIA's briefing book on Camp David created for President Carter.
- Leadership profiles from the Directorate of Intelligence on the key personalities of the Camp David summit.
- Intelligence on informal and formal inter-Arab negotiations and divisions between Israeli political parties with regard to the peace initiative and summit.
- The role of Jordan in the peace process
- Over four hundred pages of Foreign Broadcast Information Service reporting, capturing the press coverage of the negotiations, summit, and global reaction.

The documents convey a sense of the personalities, perils, and ambiguities that pervaded the lead-up to the Camp David Accords, which despite the many obstacles has had an enduring influence in the precarious peace between Israel and its largest Arab neighbor.

This collection is posted to the CIA Freedom of Information Act website at:

<http://www.foia.cia.gov/cartercampdavidaccords>

View all the CIA Historical Collections at:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/index.html>

# PRESIDENT CARTER

AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE  
IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS



All statements of facts, opinion, and analysis expressed in this booklet are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government endorsement of an article's statements or interpretations.




# President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

WEDNESDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 2013 // 9:00 – 12:00 PM

9:00 a.m	<b>Welcome</b> <b>David Stanhope</b> <i>Acting Director, Carter Library</i> <b>Joe Lambert</b> <i>Director Information Management Services, CIA</i> <b>Opening remarks/Introduction of keynote speaker</b> <b>Jonathan Mann</b> <i>Anchor and Correspondent, CNN International</i>
9:05-9:30 a.m	<b>Keynote Address: <i>Role of Intelligence in preparing for Camp David</i></b> <b>President Jimmy Carter</b> <i>39th President of the United States</i>
9:30 a.m.	<b>Introduction of featured speaker</b> <b>Jonathan Mann</b>
9:30-10:00 a.m	<b>Featured Speaker: <i>The Camp David Summit, An Insider's Perspective</i></b> <b>William Quandt</b> <i>Former Senior Staff Member, National Security Council</i>
10:00-10:15 a.m	<b><i>Break</i></b>
10:15 a.m	<b>Introduction of Panel</b> <b>Jonathan Mann</b>
10:15-11:45 a.m	<b>Panel: <i>The Role of Intelligence in Support of the Camp David Summit</i></b>  <b>Panel Chair:</b> <b>Matthew T. Penney</b> <i>CIA Historian</i>  <b>Panelists:</b> <b>Jerrold Post</b> <i>Founding Director, CIA's Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior</i> <b>Martha Neff Kessler</b> <i>Former CIA analyst on the Middle East and South Asia</i> <b>Adam Howard</b> <i>General Editor, Foreign Relations of the United States Series, Department of State</i>
11:45-11:50 a.m.	<b>Presentation of Awards</b> <b>Joe Lambert and David Stanhope</b>
11:50-12:00 p.m.	<b>Closing Remarks/Wrap up</b> <b>Jonathan Mann</b>
12:00 p.m.	<b><i>Adjourn</i></b>



4	<b>PARTNERS</b>
7	<b>CIA, CAMP DAVID, AND U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST</b> Matthew T. Penney, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence
15	<b>PERSONALITY PROFILES IN SUPPORT OF THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT</b> Jerrold Post, M.D.
20	<b>TIMELINE</b>
22	<b>SADAT &amp; BEGIN LEADERSHIP PROFILES</b>
30	<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>
56	<b>SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES</b>





The Information Review and Release Group (IRRG) of the CIA's Information Management Services is responsible for executing the Agency's Historical Review Program (HRP). This program seeks to identify and declassify collections of documents that detail the Agency's analysis and activities relating to historically significant topics and events. The HRP's goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections. To do that, IRRG works with partner organizations to organize release events to highlight each collection and make it available to the broadest audience possible.


The mission of the HRP is to:

- Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the intelligence information that has helped shape major US foreign policy decisions.
  - Broaden access to lessons-learned, presenting historical material that gives greater understanding to the scope and context of past actions.
  - Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past foreign policy decisions.
  - Showcase CIA's contributions to national security and provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of its government.
  - Demonstrate the CIA's commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.
- 



The History Staff in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence fosters understanding of the Agency's history and its relationship to today's intelligence challenges by communicating instructive historical insights to the CIA workforce, other US Government agencies, and the public. CIA historians research topics on all aspects of Agency activities and disseminate their knowledge through publications, courses, briefings and Web-based products. They also work with other Intelligence Community historians on publication and education projects that highlight interagency approaches to intelligence issues. Lastly, the CIA History Staff conducts an ambitious program of oral history interviews that are invaluable for preserving institutional memories that are not captured in the documentary record.

---



The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum in Atlanta, Georgia houses U.S. President Jimmy Carter's papers and other material relating to the Carter administration and the Carter family's life. The library also hosts special exhibits, such as Carter's Nobel Peace Prize and a full-scale replica of the Oval Office, including a copy of the Resolute Desk.

The Carter Library and Museum includes some parts that are owned and administered by the federal government, and some that are privately owned and operated. The library and museum are run by the National Archives and Records Administration and are part of the Presidential Library system of the federal government. Privately owned areas house Carter's offices and the offices of the Carter Center, a non-profit human rights agency.

The building housing the library and museum makes up 69,750 square feet, with 15,269 square feet of space for exhibits and 19,818 square feet of archive and storage space. The library stacks house 27 million pages of documents; 500,000 photos, and 40,000 objects, along with films, videos, and audiotapes. These collections cover all areas of the Carter administration, from foreign and domestic policy to the personal lives of President and Mrs. Carter.

---





President Carter delivers remarks at the swearing-in ceremony for Admiral Stansfield Turner to be Director of the CIA. (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)

## CIA, Camp David, and U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Matthew T. Penney  
CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence  
History Staff

One of the classic episodes in U.S.-Middle East relations was the meeting between President Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz al-Saud on the deck of the USS *Quincy* in February 1945. Roosevelt was returning from the Yalta conference, where he had discussed the post-war disposition of Europe with the leaders of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Believing that the United States would play a more active role in international affairs after the war, Roosevelt was especially concerned about the Middle East. The meeting was part of a series of direct U.S. bilateral engagements with regional heads of state—the others were King Farouk of Egypt and King Haile Selassie of Ethiopia—without the customary deference paid to the European allies, a forecast of the post-war order.

The iconic meeting aboard the *Quincy* relates to the present topic: Roosevelt wanted to discuss Palestine. After Roosevelt raised the issue, King Saud asked that the United States not support a Jewish state there, and Roosevelt agreed not to take action on the issue without due coordination with King Saud and other Arab leaders. Much later, William Eddy, the U.S. chargé in Saudi Arabia who had arranged the meeting, would grapple publicly with what he called a historic broken promise: the U.S. recognition of Israel and commitment to Israeli security.<sup>1</sup>



Just weeks after its creation in September 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency issued two major analytic pieces that, among other things, warned of protracted instability in the Middle East over the issue of a Jewish state in Palestine. They said that the Arab popular response to the partition would force otherwise moderate Arab governments to vigorously oppose the new state, lest they be perpetually vulnerable to overthrow. Not only was a Jewish state in the Middle East intolerable to the Arab world, the Agency said, but fear of Israeli expansion would put its Arab neighbors on a permanent war footing. One of the two CIA pieces said that the goodwill generated by the Roosevelt-Saud conference had expired. Perhaps most importantly, the second of the two pieces—which allegedly owed much of its language to Eddy, by then at the State Department—said that the great powers would have to intervene to enforce the partition and that an Arab military front would defeat a Jewish state within two years unless the United States bolstered Israeli security.

In its post-war engagement with Middle Eastern heads of state, the U.S. government sought leaders with whom it could maintain amicable relations. At one point in the early 1950s, U.S. policymakers hoped that Egyptian President Gamal ‘abd al-Nasser might bring a coalition of Arab states into a defense alliance friendly to the West. Though Nasser would be a thorn in the side of U.S. officials for most of his presidency, he was nevertheless the kind of Arab leader whom the United States could tolerate; one who maintained his own course in international affairs (despite accepting enough Soviet military aid to alarm U.S. policymakers) and one who, in his actions, was moderate toward Israel. One National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 1953 ironically said that an Egyptian-led regional defense pact could be a forum for Western influence that would counteract—rather than the seemingly more plausible outcome of stoking, among the regional populations at least—suspicions of Western imperialism. For most of the Cold War, the United States would have to look outside Egypt for its closest Middle Eastern partners, namely Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and, until 1979, Iran. Given the competition for the proverbial hearts and minds between the United States and Soviet Union, much of what interested U.S. policymakers was the survivability of the region’s leaders, to include those allied with the United States, the Soviets, or somewhere in between.<sup>2</sup>

Following the quick Israeli victory in the June 1967 war, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) monitored the Arab leaders’ efforts to regain favor with their populations, from what was a stunning loss known in the Arab world as “the setback.” In the years after 1967 the U.S. Intelligence Community considered the potential for an Arab counterassault, even one that the Arab leaders expected to lose militarily. This contradicts the conventional wisdom that the IC did not imagine such a case: As a recently declassified NIE from May 1973 shows, analysts assessed that the domestic pressure on President Anwar Sadat to redeem Egypt’s loss was such that Sadat might find even a failed invasion of Israeli-held territory politically favorable to inaction. Though the NIE stopped short of predicting war, its pages convey an astute understanding of the political climate in which Sadat operated—a far cry from the ostensible superfi-

ality often assumed. The analysts did consider most of the things that history has judged them harshly for not considering. In the end, however, they called it wrong, as we know from the joint Egyptian-Syrian attack that October during Yom Kippur.<sup>3</sup>

A recent CIA declassification event on the October 1973 war made available this NIE and many other documents. Among them were some that hinted at the longer-term ramifications of the war. As early as 19 October, CIA wrote that the Arab military strike had “greatly strengthened President Sadat’s political position in Egypt and in the Arab World generally,” and that he had “a respect and popularity that he never knew before.”<sup>4</sup> This was a different Sadat, who until then had been losing credibility with his domestic constituents and his foreign interlocutors after several years of mostly empty declarations that something had to be done about the Israeli expansion. It would be Sadat’s reputation from the 1973 war—“the Hero of the Crossing,” a reference to the assault on the Israeli position in the Sinai across the Suez Canal—that would enable him to serve as the type of Middle Eastern leader that the U.S. preferred: a moderate with enough clout to remain in power yet willing to work toward a peace settlement with the West and Israel.

The negotiations following the 1973 war set the stage for Camp David, though no factor was more important than the commitment of President Jimmy Carter. His desire for a peace agreement, and one based on a respect for Palestinian rights was encumbered, however, by the legacy of U.S. policy in the Middle East. As it had been for years, U.S. policy in the region as of 1978 was three-fold: containing Soviet influence, keeping adequate oil supplies flowing without drastic price increases, and ensuring the security of Israel. On this last point, the policy was not to achieve a peace satisfactory to all, and the United States had historically maintained no Palestine policy apart from the considerations of what role Palestinians might play in achieving a workable peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The three stated goals were intertwined. Containing Soviet influence required relationships with regional leaders. Likewise, cheap oil depended on Middle Eastern leaders with whom the United States could bargain and apply pressure. It thus served broader U.S. policy to achieve a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel even if a more comprehensive agreement was, at the time, illusory.

U.S. policymakers would have preferred such a comprehensive deal, as opposed to either a bilateral pact or a “step-by-step” approach that started with some of the more attainable issues and ultimately concluded with the most controversial. (A key problem with either of the two was an aversion to actually stating a specific end-game scenario.) The U.S. efforts with Middle Eastern leaders that eventually led to Camp David had initially envisioned a comprehensive approach, though all knew the odds were long. U.S. policymakers hoped for the participation of at least Syria and Jordan in addition to Egypt, and for the Arab side to offer a solution for the Palestine issue that Israel would not reject outright. As it became clear that among the Arab states Egypt alone was willing to deal, and when Israel gave no indication that it would compromise on the Palestinians, the talks even at their most successful would be just one step among many yet to come.



The documents in this collection attest to the difficulties Carter would face. It was clear the Arabs and Israelis would give only to the point where the domestic cost with their constituents would not be too great. In addition to the aforementioned aversion to identifying an end game, the parties seldom defined the most important terms. For example, what did Israel’s openness to “minor modifications” of the pre-1967 borders mean? Certainly the Arab leaders would have an interest in knowing. Nor were the meanings of terms like “autonomy” and “rights” defined. And then there was the persistent distrust between the two parties. At times, each side nursed the suspicion that the United States secretly sided with the other. Historical precedent gave the Arab side every reason to think that U.S. policy would favor Israel; conversely, Carter’s pronouncements about Israel needing to withdraw to the 1967 borders and his references to Palestinian rights were grounds for Israeli suspicion. Throughout, the Carter administration was not shy about stating that the rights of the Palestinians had to be respected in any peace process worthy of the name.

As if a comprehensive peace agreement was not already formidable, the Israeli elections in May 1977 brought to power a Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, who had championed the expansion of Israel’s borders and cared little about Palestinian rights. Also, unlike Sadat, Begin’s domestic political situation gave him little impetus to bring “deliverables” out of any meetings with his Arab neighbors. One of the documents in this collection, dated a week after Begin’s electoral victory, stresses the improbability of the Israeli acceptance of ceding the land it had taken in 1967.



*Top: President Jimmy Carter Speaking to CIA personnel at CIA Headquarters*

*Bottom: Prime Minister Begin at Camp David (Photos courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)*



It said that:

- “demilitarized areas, limited forces zones, forward monitoring sites, third-party reconnaissance...alone will not give Israeli leaders the confidence they now lack that the Arabs have peaceful intentions for the long term.”
- “it is unlikely that either side in the foreseeable future will modify its stated intention to control East Jerusalem...”
- “The nonmilitary benefits Israel will expect to receive in return for a withdrawal to the 1967 lines will have to be provided by the US—and to a lesser extent by the USSR and the UN—as well as the Arabs.”<sup>5</sup>

That November, President Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) gave reasons for both optimism and caution. The CIA Directorate of Intelligence (DI) Weekly Summary for 25 November 1977, after Sadat’s speech, called the trip “a major

shock treatment comparable to the one produced by his equally bold war initiative in 1973.” Perhaps it could indeed be compared to the 1973 military campaign in its boldness and impact. But whereas the 1973 war had vindicated Israel’s hard line against its Arab neighbors, the 1977 event undercut this position: with the speech, an Arab leader was calling not for war but for peace. For all of the goodwill that he generated with the West with the visit, it prompted outrage from most Arab quarters, especially Syrian leader Hafez al-Asad, on the grounds that Sadat’s trip was a de facto recognition of Israel and betrayal of the Arab cause. This assertion was shared among the most vocal elements within Egypt as well.<sup>6</sup>

The collection shows the IC’s attention to this important relationship between foreign governments and their citizens. Analysts monitored the dire state of Egypt’s economy and its struggle to provide basic services as well as the local unpopularity of Sadat’s commercial orientation to the

West. Sadat’s critics made much of his closeness to the United States specifically, and a 1977 NIE declassified for this collection considers the intense domestic pressure on Sadat to get something out of his relationship with Washington. The collection also features analysis on the Egyptian military’s dissatisfaction with its ill-preparedness for another war with Israel. Agency assessments of Middle Eastern security services in general, and Egypt specifically, left little question that the IC viewed the region’s security services as key instruments for not only quelling political dissent but also as potential agents of regime change. The notion that popular unrest created a hospitable environment to Communist assistance tended to make U.S. policy-makers tolerate the security services’ efforts to maintain the established order, and a great deal of U.S. bilateral aid went toward helping them do so.<sup>7</sup>

The 1977 NIE on Egypt opened with a discussion of Sadat’s need to make

progress on the Israeli issue to stave off domestic frustrations. The NIE said that “negotiating progress would serve, at least temporarily, to reinforce Sadat’s credibility, to lessen the military’s urgency about securing new sources of weapons, and to divert popular attention from economic woes” and that “domestic ills are an impetus for rapid improvement in negotiations.” It depicted Sadat as wanting Egypt to “maintain its status as a significant regional power beyond the time when a peace settlement with Israel might change the focus of world attention from issues of war and peace in the area to issues of oil and economics.”<sup>8</sup>

Another issue, thoroughly explored in the outside writing on the Camp David process, was that of the Palestinians. Hardly any serious discussion about a peace ignored it even when euphemisms or other terms were used instead of explicitly naming the Palestinians, the West Bank, Gaza, or Israeli settlements. President Carter wanted each side to make some sort of gesture that the other would find welcoming. He wanted the PLO to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242, which had called—in famously vague language—for Israel to withdraw from the territory it had taken in 1967. However, Resolution 242 also implicitly recognized the Israeli state. Carter hoped that PLO acceptance of the resolution would force Israel to see the Palestinians as “reasonable,” as the United States viewed it. But not only was the resolution hazily worded, it neither mentioned a potential Palestinian homeland nor, for that matter, even the word ‘Palestinians.’ The PLO had indicated it would accept the resolution only if the United States would guarantee Palestinian statehood. A complicating factor in all of this was President Sadat’s seeming ambivalence toward the Palestinian issue, in which he displayed no real commitment to a Palestinian state in favor of a moderate Palestinian leadership with which he could negotiate.

Nor was Begin’s position on the Palestine issue a giving one. During his electoral campaign in 1977, he had made the Palestinians synonymous with “terrorist,” and rejected the notion of Palestinian self-determination. The PLO did little to help the image of the Palestinians in rela-



Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, and Menachem Begin at Camp David for the Camp David Summit. (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)

tion to Israel, with the March 1978 Fatah raid on the Israeli coast and bus hijacking. In the attack, Fatah killed 38 Israelis, prompting the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. All of this came just after the Abu Nidal organization’s assassination of Yusef al-Sibai, a Sadat associate who had been part of the Egyptian Jerusalem delegation. According to a CIA Weekly Summary for 17 March 1978, the Fatah operation and Israeli response were seen in Egypt as “serious, perhaps fatal, blows” to the peace initiative.<sup>9</sup>


The collection gives the reader the sense that Carter’s role in the Camp David talks was not that of a broker between Sadat and Begin, but rather that of a negotiator in two separate talks, one with Sadat and the other with Begin. All three men would be present, but the two most meaningful dialogues could be expected to be between Carter and Sadat, and Carter and Begin. Sadat’s and Begin’s messages would most likely be designed first for Carter, second for an international audience, and only third for each other. Nor did analysts anticipate the result to be a settlement between the two sides, but rather statements that Sadat and Begin could later cite as validating his position.

Mindful of Arab-Israeli relations up to that point, U.S. policymakers and Agency analysts had no illusions by that time that Camp David was the only hope to end the conflict. Agency analysts assessed

that the Accords would be successful if Israel and Egypt continued meaningful negotiations afterward. Conversely, they would be a failure if negotiations ended, especially if a persistent impasse pushed the two sides toward war, or prompted the Saudis to play the oil card as they had in 1973. Another ramification of a failure at Camp David would be the loss of the United States’ clout as a broker and the decline of U.S. influence in the region.

Almost immediately after the Accords concluded, it was evident that their success or failure was in the eye of the beholder. For the United States, they met the minimal criteria for supporting U.S. interests. They resulted in a freeze of the Egyptian-Israeli violence and a closer U.S. relationship with Egypt. Yet the Accords avoided the all-important issue of the Palestinians. Egypt’s Arab neighbors assembled in Baghdad and denounced the Accords as being only an Egyptian agreement with Israel without any benefits to other Arab states. Because they lacked any real commitments from Israel on the most important issues, most Arab leaders and commentators saw the Accords as a capitulation to Israel.<sup>10</sup>

Initial reactions from the Palestinian community criticized the vague language and the lack of concessions to the Palestinians. The Israeli military and settlements in the West Bank, it seemed, would stay. Little was to be found that



Jimmy Carter and Anwar Sadat at Camp David for the Camp David Summit. (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)





supported Palestinian rights or self-determination; nothing guaranteed even eventual Arab sovereignty in Gaza or the West Bank, and there was no mention of East Jerusalem. The PLO, like the Arab states that gathered in Baghdad, denounced the Accords as an Egyptian surrender and called for punishing any who supported the Accords. The Muslim Brotherhood, likewise, considered them a betrayal. The summer following the Accords, CIA analysts wrote that the Israeli position would solidify the Arab opposition on the basis that Israel “would concede only enough to protect its treaty with Egypt while maintaining effective Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza and preventing the development of an independent Palestinian state.” These were behaviors that the Agency predicted in blunt language would thereafter “contribute to the Arab belief that autonomy negotiations are a sham.”

The Egyptian-Israeli peace talks that went into 1979 also coincided with a transformative event elsewhere: the revolution in Iran. By the time of Camp David, Iranian public opposition to the Shah had swept the country, and in January 1979, as Egypt and Israel were still negotiating the peace treaty, the Shah fled. CIA analysts would later write that the fall of the Shah “caused Israel and Egypt to strike more rigid positions on key unresolved issues in peace negotiations” and were unambiguous that the revolution would diminish U.S. influence in the Middle East. They also pointed out that, for Egypt, seeing the Shah unseated may give Sadat pause about the benefits of a U.S. alliance. For the Palestinians, analysts noted that the Iranian revolutionaries would provide backing and make them a more formidable actor. Ultimately, the events in Iran gave Egypt and Israel an incentive to finalize the peace treaty and silence the decade-long drumbeat of possible war between the two in this time when tension and uncertainty were on the rise region wide. With the events in Iran, Arab opposition to the peace treaty,

Top: Sadat, Carter, and Begin at Marine Corps Ceremony at Camp David.

Middle: Posters of Jimmy Carter and Anwar Sadat.

Bottom: Framework for Peace-East Room. (Photos courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)

the prospect of another oil embargo, and rumblings of anti-Americanism in places such as Tripoli and Islamabad, the makers of U.S. policy in the Middle East in 1979 had much cause for trepidation.

Any release of a discrete number of documents will have limitations, especially one that focuses on a single act in a larger pageant (and moreover, one in which the Central Intelligence Agency has decided that things cannot be included). From time to time, scholars and reviewers of past CIA document releases have found them somewhat narrow and inattentive to related issues. This view is understandable, though the scope is often narrow by design, either for resource reasons or because other documents have been made public in other forums. For example, for researchers interested in the event that put the Egyptian-Israeli talks into motion, the document release on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War should be consulted.

Like any single release, the present group of documents has some gaps. It leaves much unsaid about how the Intelligence Community viewed the Palestinian organizations apart from how they factored into the negotiations. Discussions of regional neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Syria, are mostly relegated to their responses to phases of the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli process. Largely unaddressed are Syria’s efforts to keep the PLO’s position consistent with that of Syrian President al-Asad. We see little of Jordanian King Hussein’s attempts to find a unified Arab position before finding himself on the margins. And certainly Saudi Arabia had a great deal to lose from any scenario that stood to enflame the Arab radicals—to use the term of the time—to the point that the Saudi royal family became vulnerable. (The Weekly Summaries get at this latter issue in a general way, for Saudi Arabia and other neighbors.) The collection also avoids the ever-controversial issue of the U.S. posture on Israeli settlements. And given the scope, the story does not continue much past mid-1979 to testify to the effect of the post–Camp David order on CIA’s subsequent support to policymakers.

Looking back at 1978–79, we can see what the participants then could not have

known: the Middle Eastern landscape was on the cusp of change. The Egyptian part of the Arab-Israeli dispute was quieted, and Israel could turn its attention to operations elsewhere, especially Lebanon to the north. The animosity toward Sadat from the most fervent elements in Egypt, especially the Islamists, led to his assassination in 1981. The Iranian revolution ushered in a regime hostile to the United States and ended two and a half decades of a U.S.-friendly Persian Gulf security order. Iran’s attempts to export its brand of revolutionary Islam, and its support to violent proxy groups, would plague U.S. efforts to maintain favorable security alliances in the Middle East. Operations by Lebanese Hezbollah and its affiliates, and a wave of bombings and hijackings in the early and mid-1980s, would push the United States into a more proactive counterterrorist posture, marked at CIA by the creation of the Counterterrorist Center in 1986.

Also in the 1980s, a different U.S. presidential administration would be in the White House, with different priorities for the Middle East. President Ronald Reagan viewed the Palestinians foremost in their role as a categorical enemy of a key U.S. ally, Israel. The Reagan administration made some attempts to gain Israel’s acceptance of a land-for-peace deal, but with the mid-1980s civil war in Lebanon, there was little appetite in the Reagan White House, much less in Israel, for any such “concessions” to the Palestinians, as the United States and Israel would have seen it. Since then, the United States has remained a crucial party in bringing the two sides together, with periodic milestone-like agreements that can be seen as successes or failures depending on the perspective, with the issue no less challenging for all parties than it was in 1978–79.

At present, we are still waiting to see the extent to which the events of the so-called Arab Spring, or Awakening, are an abrogation of Camp David. For the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the realities of governance during its time in power had a slight and only momentary moderating influence, with the Brotherhood’s platform changing from a rejection of the peace treaty to a call for reassessment. Egyptian government

behaviors during President Muhammad Morsi’s tenure hinted at an acceptance of the Camp David order, both by inaction and by events such as Morsi’s mediation between Israel and Hamas in fall 2012. The issue has been less clear in Syria, where the ascendancy of Salafi elements stands to end Syria’s relative moderation.

This present collection offers a window into CIA’s support to the statecraft with which one White House administration attempted a solution to an issue that has burdened every U.S. president since Roosevelt’s conversation with King Saud on the deck of the USS *Quincy*. The Central Intelligence Agency’s provision of intelligence support to the Camp David process rounds out that which is known about the policy, the national interest, the image of the United States abroad, and the human rights considerations inherent in the United States’ handling of an issue so central to the stability of this volatile region.

<sup>1</sup> CIA 1, “Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States,” 26 September 1947; CIA Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE)-55, “The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine,” 28 November 1947.

<sup>2</sup> NIE 73, “Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security,” 15 January 1953.

<sup>3</sup> NIE 30-73, “Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and Implications,” 17 May 1973. The piece says that: If Egypt does decide to initiate hostilities, it will do so in spite of the military consequences, rather than in hope of military gains” (emphasis added).

<sup>4</sup> CIA “Weekly Review,” 19 October 1973, 3.

<sup>5</sup> CIA Memorandum, “Nonmilitary Compensation for an Israeli Territorial Withdrawal,” 26 May 1977.

<sup>6</sup> CIA Memorandum, “Syria and Sadat’s Israeli Trip,” 25 November 1977; DI Weekly Summary, 18 November 1977 and 25 November 1977, quote on 1.

<sup>7</sup> NIE 36.1-1-77, “Egypt,” 3 February 1977.

<sup>8</sup> NIE 36.1-1-77, “Egypt,” 3 February 1977, negotiating progress, 8; maintain its status, 11.

<sup>9</sup> CIA Weekly Summary, 17 March 1978.

<sup>10</sup> CIA Intelligence Memorandum, “Possible Arab Acceptance of an Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty,” 27 February 1979. See also Hermann Frederick Eilts, “Improve the Framework,” in Foreign Policy No. 41 (Winter 1980–1981), 9.

<sup>11</sup> National Security Council memorandum, “CIA Analysis of Middle East Peace Negotiations,” 31 July 1979, Israel would concede only enough, 1; autonomy negotiations as a sham, 2. The CIA DI Weekly Summaries from fall 1978 are informative on these topics.

<sup>12</sup> See CIA Intelligence Memorandum, “Implications of Iran for the Middle East Peace Negotiations,” 16 February 1979, quote from 1.

<sup>13</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, publication prepared for the symposium at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California, 30 January 2013.





Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin visit to Gettysburg battleground. (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)

# Personality Profiles in Support of The Camp David Summit<sup>1</sup>

Jerrold Post, M.D.

Among the briefing materials President Carter carried to Camp David for his historic meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in September 1978 were a personality profile on each of the two Middle Eastern leaders and a third profile comparing their personalities and negotiating style. Following his diplomatic triumph, the President conveyed his appreciation to the Central Intelligence Agency for the intelligence support provided him and singled out the personality profiles for special praise: “After spending 13 days with the two principals,” he said, “I wouldn’t change a word.”

The history of studies relating personality and political behavior predates the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency, but controversy over the validity of such studies is as strong today as when Walter Langer and his associates probed the psyche of Adolf Hitler for the OSS. Much of the current controversy is over causality: was a particular political occurrence caused by a leader’s psyche, or did it result from the action of political, historical, and cultural forces? This, I submit, is an unnecessary focus of contention, for we believe, along with most historians, that most leadership decisions are multiply determined, and it is when a leader’s psychological and political needs are congruent that there is a particularly strong drive toward action. Even the most diehard critic would probably agree that if there is any occasion on which personality features weigh heavily in political proceedings, it is during unstructured negotiations among world leaders from different cultures with different perceptions, values, attitudes, and styles. Such was the case at Camp David.

On a visit to the Agency in August 1978, President Carter interrupted a briefing to ask the assembled analysts and intelligence production managers how they could help him before the forthcoming summit meeting, which had only recently been announced. He particularly indicated that he wanted to be “steeped in the personalities of Begin and Sadat.”

<sup>1</sup> This article was originally published in CIA’s in-house journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 23, summer 1979.





Camp David Summit. (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)

The presidential request sent a spasm through the National Foreign Assessment Center. The Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA) was tasked with preparing political profiles which emphasized the political perspectives of the two main actors; the Office of Central Reference (OCR) was tasked with preparing updated biographic profiles which emphasized personality features; and the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (CAPPB) in the Office of Scientific Intelligence was tasked with updating the studies of the personality and political behavior of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin which had been produced in 1977.

In short order, the several components produced the required material. CAPPB's contribution consisted of three pieces: an updated personality profile of Begin, which called attention to the increasing trend of oppositionism and rigidity in his personality; an updated profile of Sadat, entitled "Sadat's Nobel Prize Complex," which stressed his increasing preoc-

cupation with his role in history and the leverage this could provide in negotiations; and a paper which discussed the implications for negotiations of the contrasting intellectual styles of Begin and Sadat. To eliminate redundancy, the OCR and CAPPB profiles were integrated, emphasizing personality features of the leaders apt to become of particular significance during the negotiations. The two integrated personality profiles and the discussion of Begin's and Sadat's contrasting intellectual styles were the personality materials forwarded to support the Camp David negotiations.

It is important to emphasize that the ability of all components to respond effectively in the brief time available rested upon a foundation of significant background research as well as continuing monitoring of the target leaders. In the balance of this discussion, some of the research efforts employed to clarify the personality and political behavior of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin will be described.

A recurring difficulty in analyzing the personality of world leaders is that the necessary data, although ultimately obtainable, has not been systematically recorded. Requests for "instant magic" are not uncommon when a coup, assassination—or in more civilized countries, election—leads to a change of leadership. In order to anticipate the needs of the intelligence community, over the years CAPPB has regularly surveyed key intelligence consumers to identify leaders of special interest, including emerging leaders, and establish research priorities. In developing this priority list, State/INR, Defense/ISA, the National Security Council, and the National Intelligence Officers are surveyed. Parenthetically, these survey results have always impressed the authors with the vigorous diversity of interests among the key consumers. Indeed, prior to the survey of the summer of 1976 no single highest priority candidate has ever been unanimously identified by all components. But that survey revealed across-the-board highest priority interest in one world leader, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt.

In developing personality studies several kinds of data are reviewed. In addition to drawing on all classified reporting, a thorough review of the open literature is conducted. Official and unofficial biographies have often provided key background material and insights, as have television, newspaper and magazine profiles. When there are significant holes in the data, requirements are sent to the field to attempt to develop the missing information. But the data which is particularly rich and especially helpful in developing a solid felling for the complexities of the personality of a leader is derived from debriefings of senior government and military officials and individuals from the private sector who have had significant personal contact with the object of the study. Official reporting has often been so heavily slanted toward current political concerns that a wealth of astute observations concerning perceptions, attitudes, and negotiating styles of the actors has never been recorded. These perceptions and observations can be lost during the transition from one administration to another, especially if the observations were made during the course of extremely sensitive negotiations, the details of which were necessarily closely held.

The strategic importance of the Middle East, the relative imperviousness

of the Near Eastern mind to Western perceptions, and the highly personalized leadership styles of its rulers have had the effect of focusing a disproportionate share of CAPPB's efforts on the personalities of Near Eastern leaders. In the process of developing studies of such leaders as King Hussein of Jordan, Yitzak Rabin of Israel, and Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, we had regularly debriefed key officials whose concern was the Middle East, including participants in the shuttle diplomacy of the Kissinger era. So when we began research for our study of Sadat in the winter of 1977, we had some material already on hand and were able to reinterview those who had significant contact with Sadat.

Several themes emerged as we collated interview impressions. Sadat's concern with his role in history and his preoccupation with "the big picture," coupled with his abhorrence of details, were regularly mentioned. By appealing to Sadat's long-range goals, Secretary Kissinger was often able to overcome negotiating impassess over technical details.

Ambassador Eilts related one amusing and charming anecdote which epitomized this quality. The occasion was a luncheon hosted by President Sadat just after a breakthrough in negotiations.

Present were President Sadat, Madame Sadat, Secretary Kissinger, and Ambassador Eilts. "Your Excellency," said Secretary of State Kissinger, raising his glass, "without your broad vision of history and your refusal to be bogged down by petty detail, we never would have come to this day." "No, Henry," replied President Sadat, "it was your negotiating skill which brought us to this day." "Oh no, Your Excellency," replied Kissinger, "it was your ability to think in strategic terms that..." At this point, Madame Sadat interrupted with a loud sigh to Ambassador Eilts, "Oh no, here we go again."

A major conclusion of this study addressed the manner in which Sadat's special view of himself and this "big picture mentality" interacted. "Sadat's self-confidence and special view of himself has been instrumental in development of his innovative foreign policy, as have his flexibility and his capacity for moving outside of the cultural insularity of the Arab world. He sees himself as a grand strategist and will make tactical concessions if he is persuaded that his overall goals will be achieved.... His self-confidence has permitted him to make bold initiatives, often overriding his advisors' objections."

A finished study was disseminated in April 1977, on the eve of Sadat's state visit to the United States. Israeli politics were in acute disarray at the time. Yitzak Rabin was forced to step aside as Labor Party leader in part because of revelations of his wife's financial activities, and the controversial Shimon Peres became leader with the elections of the Knesset only a month away. On reading the study of Sadat on a Friday, President Carter requested for his reading the next Monday a similar study of Shimon Peres, who, it was widely assumed—despite the Labor Party's difficulties—would be the next prime minister of Israel. (There has been an assumption that we maintain such studies as "shelf items" on all leaders of significance.) Modestly disavowing superhuman abilities, we indicated we would immediately begin research on a personality study on Peres, and returned to debrief again the shuttle diplomats.

Jimmy Carter, Rosalynn Carter, Anwar Sadat – Walking at Camp David. (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)





We were in the midst of the first drafts when the stunning election upset occurred which brought Menachem Begin to power. With retrospective wisdom, most analysts have attributed Peres’ loss to Labor Party complacency and widespread voter disgust with allegations of corruption by the Labor government.<sup>2</sup>

With the election of Menachem Begin, the material on Peres was put aside for another day, and research was immediately commenced on the new prime minister. In contrast to Peres, who was well known to a number of US Government officials, there had been little official contact with Begin. But there was a rich source of information in the open literature, for in two autobiographic works, the “White Nights” and “The Revolt,” Begin had revealed a great deal of the experience which had honed his attitude. His preoccupation with legal precision and his inability to restrain himself from clarifying imprecision was well illustrated by his arguing with his Russian jailers about details of the Soviet legal code. Furthermore, in analyzing the form as well as the content of his writing, it was possible to understand some of the complexities of his cognitive style. Later, Ambassador Lewis provided particularly illuminating personal observations of the new prime minister’s personality. The CAPPB study was disseminated in July 1977, in time for Begin’s first visit with President Carter.

Once a personality study is completed, with a thorough analysis of the basic personality structure, it forms a basis for continued monitoring of the subject. This is particularly important for an individual like Begin, who had not coped with national leadership before. A major question raised but unanswered by the initial study was whether this leader, who had spent his lifetime in opposition, could function as a leader for all the people, utilizing skills of compromise and developing consensus.



Jimmy Carter, Rosalynn Carter, and the Begins walking at Camp David. (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)

The creative diplomacy of November and December of 1977, highlighted by Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem, placed even greater emphasis on the personalities of the two key actors. A particularly interesting aspect of this visit, and something probably insufficiently attended to, was the impact of the media upon political behavior and the conduct of negotiations. Sadat’s already special view of himself was given a new boost. We initially characterized this personality reaction “the Barbara Walter syndrome,” but by summer of 1978, as it grew exponentially, designated it as Sadat’s Nobel Prize complex.” As we followed his political behavior particularly closely over the next several months, one of the most interesting changes had to do with the sharp increase in the first person singular. The frequency of the word “I” increased dramatically in Sadat’s statements. There were accounts suggesting that Sadat would not accept reports indicating that his goals for Egypt and himself were in trouble. There was a consequent shrinkage of the leadership circle around Sadat to those who would support his optimism.

In parallel, Prime Minister Begin demonstrated a continuing facility for statements of a provocative nature, often precipitated by reporter’s questions. A member of our center traveled to Israel to update the earlier study of Begin and focused extensively on some of the growing oppositional properties in Begin’s personality.

The prominence of these personality features led to a proposal that one of the dinner seminars hosted periodically by the Director of Central Intelligence be devoted to the topic of “The role of personality in the Middle East conflict.” The dinner was held in the spring of 1978, attended by a number of those who had been intimately involved in Middle East negotiations, including Ambassador-at-large Alfred Atherton, Ambassador to Egypt Herman Eilts, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs Harold Saunders, and Dr. William Quandt, the NSC’s senior Near Eastern specialist.

In pulling together materials for this meeting we focused particularly on matters of form, entirely apart from political substance, and addressed such issues as Sadat’s abhorrence of detail con-



Top: Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin at Camp David for the Camp David Summit.

Bottom: Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, and Menachem Begin at Camp David for the Camp David Summit. (Photos courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)

trasted with Begin’s predilection for precision and legalism. This precipitated a lively discussion among the participants on just how different Begin and Sadat were as personalities, and the problems these differences made when they were being dealt with in concert. One senior official advanced the notion that the personality differences were so profound that the two leaders should never be brought together in the same room. The task of preparing for the dinner discussions and distilling and analyzing the proceedings led us to sharpen the focus of our analysis on the stylistic differences between Begin and Sadat, and helped pave the way for the focused personality materials produced in support of the Camp David summit.

In focusing on the differences, there was an explicit analysis of the problems in simultaneous negotiation which these differences would produce, with some recommendations for dealing with these diverse personalities. The special circumstances of Camp David temporarily narrowed the differences between these two extraordinary individuals and made possible the Camp David accords. Needless to say, the gap persists. Above and beyond the massive political problems which must be overcome to reach a settlement, the fundamentally differing personalities of the two key actors remain a major source of tension in this historic drama, and will require continued observation and evaluation by the intelligence community.

<sup>2</sup> This is not the first occasion when the request for a personality study appeared to precipitate the downfall of a leader. The publication of a study of King Idris preceded the takeover of Libya by Qadhafi in a coup by two weeks. A principal conclusion of the study of Rene Barrientos of Bolivia was that “because of a strong need to prove himself as a man, Barrientos would likely burn himself out before his time.” Barrientos died shortly after publication, having piloted his helicopter into a high-tension wire. Just in the past year, the program was having a remarkable record. Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa resigned because of poor health shortly after the publication of the personality study on the very day a major analysis of the decision-making structure in the Vorster government was disseminated. The succession problem in the Soviet Union was thrown into disarray by the death of Kulakov, one of the prime contenders to succeed Brezhnev. His unexpected death by a heart attack followed by two weeks initiation of research on his study. Our study of Boumediene of Algeria was being drafted when Boumediene suffered an incapacitating an ultimately fatal cerebellar hemorrhage. An attempt to assassinate Prime Minister-elect Ohira of Japan was made on the very day our draft study was submitted for editing. Most recently, the initiation of a major research study on Ugandan leader Idi Amin Dada was followed almost immediately by a Tanzanian counterattack on Uganda, and on the day the study was disseminated Tanzanian troops were reported in the streets of Kampala. Although this pattern appears to transcend coincidence, it is not true that initiation of a CAPPB personality study is being used as an alternative to covert action.



# President Carter


## Camp David Timeline

6 JAN

The Israeli government decides to hold early elections in May.

18-19 JAN

Riots occur in Cairo following sudden food price increases.



7-8 MAR

President Jimmy Carter meets Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in Washington.

9 MAR


Carter makes a statement on the three key ingredients of a Middle East settlement: real peace, secure borders, and Palestinian rights.

16 MAR

In a town meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts, Carter speaks of a "homeland" for the Palestinians.

9 MAY

Carter meets Syrian President Asad in Geneva.




17 MAY

Israeli elections favor Likud bloc.

24-25 MAY

Carter meets Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd in Washington.



19-20 JUL


Carter meets Prime Minister Begin in Washington.

9 NOV

Sadat announces his willingness to go to Jerusalem to speak before the Knesset.

19-20 NOV

Sadat meets with Begin and other Israeli political figures in Jerusalem.



4 JAN

In Aswan, Egypt, Carter makes a statement on the Palestinians.

15-17 DEC


Begin presents his "Home rule" proposal to Carter in Washington.

25-26 DEC

Begin meets Sadat in Ismailiya, Egypt.

31 DEC

Carter leaves on trip that takes him to Iran, where he meets with King Hussein; he subsequently visits Saudi Arabia and Egypt.




1977

1978

11 MAR

The PLO attacks an Israeli bus; Israelis respond by launching Operation Litani, a military intervention in southern Lebanon.



21-22 MAR

Carter meets Begin in Washington.

6 AUG

Vance visits Jerusalem to invite Begin to Camp David.

7-8 AUG


Vance visits Alexandria, Egypt to invite Sadat to Camp David.

5 NOV

The Arab summit in Baghdad criticizes Camp David Accords.

15 JAN

The shah of Iran leaves his country.



2-4 MAR


Carter meets with Begin in Washington.

6 MAR

Brzezinski meets with Sadat in Cairo to convey the new proposals.


7-13 MAR

Carter travels to Egypt and Israel to bring the negotiations to an end.



26 MAR

Sadat and Begin sign the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in Washington.



17-19 JUL

Vance, Dayan, and Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel meet at Leeds Castle, England.

30 JUL


Carter decides to invite Sadat and Begin to summit meeting at Camp David.

1 SEP

Carter holds a National Security Council meeting to discuss the Camp David summit.


5-17 SEP

Carter, Sadat, and Begin meet at Camp David.



17 SEP

Sadat and Begin sign the Camp David Accords at the White House; Carter signs as witness.



10-14 DEC

Vance travels to the Middle East to complete the text of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.

1 FEB

Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran.

1978

1979



## Leadership Profiles



Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Begin meeting at Camp David Summit Meeting. (Courtesy: Jimmy Carter Library)



Anwar al-SADAT  
(Phonetic: saDAHT)

EGYPT

President (since  
September 1970)

Addressed as:  
Mr. President



When Anwar al-Sadat, a former revolutionary and ardent nationalist who rose from peasant origins, assumed the Presidency after the death of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, it was widely assumed that he had neither the strength nor the political astuteness to be successful. He has, however, long since shaken his image [redacted] and proved to be a moderate leader and a pragmatic politician and diplomat. He has become known for his realism, political acumen, and capacity for surprising, courageous and dramatic decisions. [redacted]

[redacted] He has continued to seek a peace settlement with remarkable self-confidence and optimism in the face of both risk and failure.

#### Leadership Style

Sadat's dominance of the decisionmaking process--especially in foreign policy--has become increasingly evident in the peace talks with Israel: senior foreign affairs advisers are not always certain what the President has in mind, and they must refer major decisions to Sadat personally.

Sadat [redacted] believes that Egyptians are superior to other Arabs. He takes pride in his peasant origins and in his reputation for being sensitive to his people's needs. He wants to go down in history as the man who improved the economic and social well-being of the ordinary Egyptian. Sadat has, however, far less understanding of or interest in economic matters than he has in foreign affairs or politics, and he devotes little time to this major problem area. A consummate politician, he looks at most issues in political terms, and if he is confronted with policy problems in which political factors and economic considerations are in conflict, his decision is likely to be influenced by the former.

#### Personal Data

In accordance with his upbringing, Sadat remains a deeply religious man. He speaks good English, but he does not always pick up nuances or follow complex reasoning. Soft spoken and serious, the 59-year-old President is warm in manner. His wife, Jihan, is an elegant, graceful woman. The couple has four children.

23 August 1978



Menachem BEGIN  
(Phonetic: BAYghin)

ISRAEL

Prime Minister  
(since June 1977)

Addressed as:  
Mr. Prime Minister



Israel's sixth Prime Minister, Menachem Begin is the first in the history of the state not to be a member of the Labor Party (LP). As such, he may well instigate a major shift in Israeli policies, both foreign and domestic. A highly principled man with strong beliefs.

Begin is regarded as a hardliner on most issues.

He holds a master's degree in jurisprudence,

Since his election, however, a new image of the Prime Minister has begun to emerge in Israel--that of a sober and thoughtful national leader, a man of integrity whose forthrightness could renew Israeli pride and refurbish the country's image abroad.

As the almost undisputed leader of the political right wing, Begin spent 29 years in parliamentary opposition to LP-led governments. He has consistently maintained a strong, even autocratic, control of Herut (Freedom Movement), GAHAL (Herut-Liberal Party alliance) and the Likud bloc (GAHAL and other rightwing groups). Begin is primarily concerned with political issues. Domestic issues, particularly if they involve the economy, have in the past been the concerns of the Liberal Party faction of Likud, and the economic portion of the Likud electoral platform was largely written by the Liberals. Recently Begin has indicated that Minister of Finance Simcha Ehrlich, the leader of the Liberal Party and its key economic policy maker, will have a free hand in such matters and will set the tone, if not the substance, of economic policy.

(cont.)

CR M 77-13279

### Economy

The Begin government has highly ambitious goals for the economy. The new administration will not continue the Labor Party's socialistic approach toward the economy, which included heavy governmental involvement in that sector. Begin has stated that his government will encourage private enterprise and pursue a liberal laissez-faire economic policy, with governmental guidance only to assure its prosperity. Through a decrease in government expenditures and imports, increases in exports, and real currency devaluations of 5 percent over and above the differential inflation rate, the new government plans to reduce the current balance-of-payments deficit by half--to \$1.5 billion within 5 years. Begin has also said that there will be a concerted effort to increase capital investment from abroad, with special emphasis on the construction of rental housing. The Likud's electoral platform calls for the return to an economic growth rate of 5 to 8 percent, to be achieved mainly through marked increases in productivity. The platform stated that there would be no increase in taxes for at least 2 years and that through wage and price freezes during the same period, inflation could be curbed substantially--it would be gradually cut to 15 percent. Begin has also said that there will be programs to extend educational and housing assistance to large families in an effort to abolish poverty.

With the objective of continuing the present state of full employment, Begin's coalition will, of necessity, be active in labor-government relations. The Prime Minister has promised greater restrictions on the Histadrut, Israel's monolithic trade union, even though the LP alignment maintained its control in that organization's June elections. These restrictions will include compulsory arbitration as a means of curtailing wildcat strikes, which the government feels can have a ruinous effect on the entire economy. Begin has often stated that the Histadrut will have to distinguish between what he calls its positive functions as a trade union and its ownership of commercial enterprises.

The Likud platform proposed that the entire government trading unit in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry be dismantled and its functions be taken over by private and/or cooperative trading firms. If this occurs, it could have marked impact



on US-Israeli trade. Such a change would be particularly obvious in the agricultural realm, where Israel has long been an almost captive market for US exports--because of the established commercial ties between the purchasing mission in New York and its US suppliers, and because of the liberal US export credits.

#### Foreign Policy

He was forced to flee Poland at the outbreak of World War II, having lost his mother, father and brother to the Nazis; and later he was imprisoned for a time in a concentration camp in northern Russia:

In the mid-1940's Begin was the leader of the Irgun Tsvai Le Umi, a Jewish underground movement that operated in Palestine during the British Mandate. The ideology of the Irgun--that all of Eretz Israel is historically and biblically the rightful homeland of the Jewish people--is projected in Begin's strong stand on that issue today.

Begin has consistently stated that he opposes withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza or any return to the borders that existed before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, though he has left open the possibility of minor concessions on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. He says that his government will encourage settlements on the West Bank--lands he considers to have been liberated rather than occupied by the Israelis in the 1967 war. He also considers the area to be of strategic importance to national security. Begin is opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state and to any negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Instead, he favors direct negotiations with the Arab states and has recently said that Israel is prepared to attend a reconvened Middle East peace conference in Geneva in the fall. Although his stated West Bank policy seems to impose a condition, he has said that all participants should come to Geneva without prior conditions and that all issues are negotiable.

- 3 -

Begin believes that face-to-face meetings with world leaders can bring about changes in their approaches to complex and seemingly intractable international problems. In line with this belief, he says that the United States and Israel can come to an understanding on the Arab question and continue their long history of good relations, a fundamental objective of Israeli foreign policy. He has been openly supportive of President Jimmy Carter's policy on human rights and considers this country the leader of the free world. Appreciative of US economic and military aid, he nonetheless feels that US-Israeli relations are based on the mutual needs and interests of not just one but both nations.

Begin is rarely if ever addressed by his first name. He speaks English, French, German, Polish and Russian.

7 July 1977

- 4 -





Bibliography



## Arab Leadership Perceptions of the US

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 18 February 1976

“This memorandum attempts to identify broad trends in the attitudes of the Arab states toward the US. It is not meant to be all-inclusive, for the sake of brevity, it does not examine each Arab state in detail. Rather, individual states are discussed as they exemplify trends and illustrate the wide range of opinion among Arabs.... It reflects impressions gained following extensive discussions with officials of US embassies in Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Algeria.”

## Egypt: Sadat’s Domestic Position

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 01 June 1976

“Though Egyptian President Sadat remains in control, there are grounds for concern about the strength of his domestic position. Reports from a variety of sources over the past several months have conveyed a mixed picture of the stability of his regime and the degree of support for his leadership.”

## The Situation in the Middle East: The Arab Peace Offensive

DI // Finished Intelligence // 04 January 1977

“The principal developments in the Middle East over the past several months have been: the reconciliation of Egypt and Syria; the willingness of Saudi Arabia to break with its OPEC partners on oil pricing and to use OPEC as a forum for underscoring the necessity for progress on the Arab-Israeli dispute; the imposition of a more durable cease-fire in Lebanon; [and] the resignation of Prime Minister Rabin and the scheduling of early national elections in Israel. These developments have set the state for the launching of a major Arab peace offensive led by Egypt and Syria and backed by Saudi Arabia.... They are prepared to press the US to reconvene the Geneva conference and to accept the participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in future negotiations.”

## Egypt-Jordan: Sadat, Hussein Statement

DI // Current Intelligence // 17 January 1977

“Egyptian President Sadat and Jordanian King Hussein issued a joint statement over the weekend calling for a Palestinian state and strong ties to Jordan and for resumption of Geneva peace talks with the Palestinian Liberation Organization participating as an equal, independent party. The statement appears designed primarily to underscore current Arab solidarity and to maintain pressure on Israel and the US to move toward serious Middle East negotiations later this year.”

## Egypt: Widespread Rioting; Syria: New Flexibility

DI // Current Intelligence // 19 January 1977

“Syrian President Asad, whose interview in Time magazine this week indicated a new public flexibility on Palestinian participation in peace negotiations, was even more forceful in his private remarks.... In his interview, Asad said that refusal by the Palestinian Liberation Organization to attend the Geneva conference

would not ‘cause paralysis’.... Indicating some impatience with the PLO’s inability to devise a clear-cut policy on either negotiations or future Palestinian statehood, Asad said he favors establishment of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza ‘as long as Palestinians want it.’ Asad’s published and private remarks are a marked departure from his position of a year ago, when he demanded that any Arab-Israeli territorial negotiations must involve the PLO.”

## Egypt

DI // Current Intelligence // 21 January 1977

“President Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein ended their year-long estrangement during Hussein’s visit to Egypt last week. Sadat used the opportunity to explore his strategy for encouraging peace negotiations by providing for a federated relationship between Jordan and any future Palestinian state.... The Foreign Minister Fahmi explained at a recent press conference that the fact and the shape of any future Palestinian-Jordanian relationship must finally be decided by the parties themselves and not be dictated by Egypt or Israel.”

## Presidential Review Memorandum/ NSC-3 - Middle East

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 21 January 1977

“The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, undertake an analysis of policy alternatives on the immediate short-term issues in the Middle East and on the broader question of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Issues of immediate concern that should be specifically addressed include: —The Israeli request for an additional \$800 million in Security Assistance and Foreign Military Sales credits in FY 1978, —Anti-boycott legislation. The current legislative efforts to combat the Arab boycott should be analyzed in terms of probably diplomatic and economic consequences, as well as the probable effect of this legislation on Arab boycott actions.”

## The Israeli Election and its Impact on Peace Negotiations

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 February 1977

“On the peace negotiations issue, it would probably not make much difference whether another Labor government were headed by Prime Minister Rabin or by Defense Minister Peres. Both men strongly oppose negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and withdrawals to the 1967 borders.”

## National Intelligence Estimate: Egypt-1977

DCI/NIC // NIE // 03 February 1977

“Meaningful progress this year in Middle East peace negotiations will be critical for President Sadat. Egypt’s domestic problems limit his ability to wait long for substantial movement, while intra-Arab pressures constrain his ability to negotiate independently of the other Arabs.”

## PRC Meeting on Middle East: Aid and Anti-Boycott Issues

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 04 February 1977

“It was the consensus of the group that, on strictly military and assistance grounds, option 1—no increase over the Ford budget of \$1.5 billion assistance to Israel—would be justified. However, out of desire to achieve a favorable political atmosphere for Secretary Vance’s trip to the Middle East, we propose to explain to Ambassador Dinitz that, while we believe that \$1.5 billion (\$1 billion FMS, \$500 million SSA) is adequate, we will ask for an increase of \$285 million in FMS in the FY 78 budget to bring the total up to FY 77 level.”

## Egypt: Sadat Lays Down the Law

DI // Current Intelligence // 04 February 1977

“President Sadat failed to offer any quick or easy remedies to the economic hardships facing the Egyptian people in a major address yesterday. The speech—billed as Sadat’s response to the riots that shook Egypt some two weeks ago—stuck to the themes presented early in the week.... Sadat blamed the disturbances on a conspiratorial leftist minority.”

## Interest of PLO Chairman Arafat Establishing a Dialogue with the USG

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 08 February 1977

“Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat is seeking ways of establishing a dialogue with United States Government officials but is uncertain about how to accomplish this. Arafat expressed interest in having [less than one line redacted] contact you to discuss ways in which a dialogue could be established. Arafat indicated that the idea for a dialogue originated with Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat.”

## The Arab Peace Offensive

DI // Current Intelligence // 11 February 1977

“Egypt and Syria have called for a resumption of the Geneva conference by March—not intending that this date should be taken literally, but wishing to underscore the urgency of the Arab peace offensive. The Syrians are almost certainly even more skeptical than the Egyptians that rapid movement is possible; Asad is less optimistic than Sadat about the extent of Israeli flexibility and the degree to which the US is able to influence Israel.”

## Egypt

DI // Current Intelligence // 11 February 1977

“Recent new anti-Soviet actions by the Egyptians and another postponement by the USSR of negotiations on a bilateral trade protocol for 1977 have aggravated long-standing strains in Egyptian-Soviet relations.... The Soviets do not want to make bilateral relations still worse and have therefore been reticent in their response.”

## Egypt: Anti-Subversion Law

DI // Current Intelligence // 12 February 1977

“The approval this week by Egyptian voters of a tough new anti-subversion law caps off President Sadat’s campaign to restore the government’s prestige in the wake of violent riots last month. Passage of the new law—which puts into effect harsh penalties for illegal political activity, demonstrations, and tax evasion—may be interpreted by some, however, as a sign of Sadat’s weakness.”

## Egypt: Containing Consumer Pressures

DI // Current Intelligence // 14 February 1977

“During the last week in January, rioting by Egypt’s normally docile population forced international attention on the political-economic tightrope that President Sadat is walking.... For almost a decade, the discontent among urban Egyptians was kept under control by the threat of war.... To the average Egyptian, however, the Sinai II agreement of 1975 marked the end of war and the beginning of a perplexing new economic era.”

## Lebanon-Palestinians: Restrictions

DI // Current Intelligence // 14 February 1977

“The series of new restrictions on Palestinian activity in Lebanon apparently agreed to on Saturday by the quadripartite committee—representatives of Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait charged with overseeing the Lebanese ceasefire—appear designed to bring the fedayeen movement under closer Syrian control and to limit the ability of the Palestinians to obstruct the peace process.”

## Israel Prepares for an Election

DI // Current Intelligence // 18 February 1977

“Israel’s national election on May 17 is likely to be the closest in the country’s history. The governing Labor Party, which has generally dominated Israeli politics since independence in 1948, is in trouble and could emerge considerably weakened. It might even lose to the right-wing Likud bloc by a narrow margin. The election results could thus have a significant impact on the timing and pace of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.”

## Arab and Israeli Reactions to US Steps in the Middle East (Reactions to Vance’s Trip)

DI // Finished Intelligence // 22 February 1977

“The Israelis appear to have been reassured by the outcome of their discussions with Secretary of State Vance [less than one line redacted] at least for the present. The Arabs also seem outwardly pleased by the Secretary’s visit as a concrete demonstration of US concern about the area, which they sought in initiating their so-called ‘peace offensive.’”

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 February 1977

“Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin narrowly won endorsement on February 23 as the Labor Party’s candidate for prime minister in the general election scheduled for May 17.... Rabin’s margin of victory over his challenger, Defense Minister Shimon Peres, was only 41 votes out of some 3,000 cast.”



## Syria-USSR

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 February 1977

“Syrian President Asad wants to reduce his country’s overall dependence on the Soviets and thereby weaken Soviet political leverage in situations—such as occurred in Lebanon—where interests conflict. Syria is not out to sever its ties with the USSR, however, and is proceeding cautiously to avoid being cut off from vital Soviet supplies.”

## Cooperation and Conflict Among the Gulf States

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 March 1977

“The nations of the Persian Gulf are not merely enormously wealthy; they have longstanding historical, ideological, cultural, and territorial differences. Despite these, however, several factors work for tolerance, if not complete cooperation, among the three major littoral states, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.... This study assesses the range of conflict and cooperation among the Gulf states.... It starts with the assumption that the general character of the regimes of the Gulf states will remain unchanged for the next 5 years or so, and the principal judgments are made in that framework. Section IV (pp. 20) addresses a number of contingencies involving major change in regimes or policies.”

## Jordan-Palestinians

DI // Current Intelligence // 04 March 1977

“Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization last week began formal talks in Amman aimed at reconciling their feud in the interest of developing a common Arab position and strategy for peace negotiations with Israel.”

## Lebanon

DI // Current Intelligence // 04 March 1977

“Fighting in southern Lebanon between Palestinian-leftist forces and Christian militiamen supported by Israeli artillery fire has continued almost unabated since late January. The Palestinians are getting the worst of it and may lose all access to the border with Israel.”

## Sudan-Egypt-Syria

DI // Current Intelligence // 04 March 1977

“A meeting of the presidents of Sudan, Egypt, and Syria held in Khartoum on February 27 and 28 underlined the close relations that have developed among their moderate governments. The three presidents plan to get together privately with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Fahd when he is in Cairo next week to represent his country—their common benefactor—at the first Afro-Arab summit.”

## Libya-Egypt: Relations

DI // Current Intelligence // 09 March 1977

“Radio Tripoli reported on Sunday that Egyptian authorities had closed the border between Libya and Egypt. The Libyans also said the Egyptians were interfering with Libyan aircraft and had turned back a number of scheduled flights.”

## Jordan-PLO: Beginning a Dialogue

DI // Current Intelligence // 11 March 1977

“The talks that Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization began recently under pressure from Egypt and Syria are unlikely to resolve quickly the problems between King Hussein’s regime and the Palestinians but could lead to closer coordination of strategy for Middle East peace negotiations.”

## USSR-Syria: Official Visit

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 March 1977

“Syrian President Asad has accepted a Soviet invitation to meet with General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow early in April, before Asad’s meeting with President Carter in Europe.... Both sides probably hope the Asad-Brezhnev meeting will prevent more slippage in relations.”

## Saudi Arabia; Lebanon

DI // Current Intelligence //18 March 1977

DI reporting on a new Saudi Arabian plan to construct a 1,270 kilometer crude oil pipeline linking its oil fields to the Red Sea; the assassination on March 16 of Progressive Socialist Party leader Kamal Jumblatt.

## Egypt: Fahmi Speech

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 March 1977

Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi interprets public statements by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev as a “guarantee that there will be movement on Middle East problems because each statement requires the other major power to react.”

## Palestinians

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 March 1977

“The Palestine National Council—the policy-making parliamentary body of the Palestine Liberation Organization—concluded a 10-day meeting in Cairo on March 20; the council last met in 1974. The recent session produced no dramatic changes in Palestinian policy, but PLO chief Yasir Arafat apparently strengthened his political position.”

## Israel: Rabin’s Resignation

DI // Current Intelligence // 08 April 1977

“Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s resignation, following press disclosures that he had maintained illegal bank accounts in the US, seems certain to hurt the ruling Labor Alignment’s prospects at the polls next month. Because of its reformist image, the new moderate Democratic Movement for Change led by Yigal Yadin seems likely to gain the most from Labor’s latest misfortune.”

## USSR-Egypt; Lebanon

DI // Current Intelligence // 08 April 1977

Soviet-Egyptian relations on the mend as indicated by the signing of the annual 1977 trade protocol. Fighting between Christian extremists and Palestinian-leftist forces has increased in southern Lebanon over the last two weeks.

## Israel: Peres Endorsement

DI // Current Intelligence // 11 April 1977

“Following the Israeli Labor Party’s endorsement yesterday of Defense Minister Peres as its candidate for prime minister, party leaders are trying to achieve some measure of unity between Peres and those groups within the coalition Labor Alignment that have long opposed him.”

## Israel; Lebanon, Egypt-Libya

DI // Current Intelligence // 15 April 1977

Exposure of financial irregularities and Rabin’s withdrawal from Labor’s electoral list lead to uncertainties for Israel’s national election in May. Fighting in southern Lebanon between Christian extremists and Palestinians subsides; mounting tensions between Egypt and Libya give way to violence: “The Egyptian consulate in Benghazi was sacked last weekend, and its workers confined in a nearby hotel.... Egypt has retaliated in kind to almost every incident. Egyptians burned the Libyan consulate in Alexandria.” The government of Libya reportedly executes 20 Libyan military officers “convicted of participating in a coup attempt against President Qadhafi in 1975.”

## Israeli Windfall

DI // Current Intelligence // 20 April 1977

Prime Minister Rabin’s resignation has provided Defense Minister Peres an opportunity to unite the Labor party, possibly making the campaign strategy of the opposition parties much more difficult.

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 22 April 1977

Rabin’s resignation has not affected the Labor Party seriously, and may work to Labor’s advantage in the election.

## USSR-Syria: Asad’s Visit

DI // NID // 23 April 1977

The communiqué issued after Asad’s five-day visit to the USSR indicates that the Soviets have agreed to supply additional arms and economic assistance to Syria. The meeting also appears to have shifted the Soviet stance of requiring Palestinian representation at Geneva, with Syria and USSR stating that the PLO should be represented at any Middle East peace talks “from the very beginning and on an equal footing.”

## USSR-Syria; USSR-Israel, Lebanon; Arab States

DI // Current Intelligence // 29 April 1977

Conclusion of Asad’s meeting with Brezhnev; Soviet military visit UN offices in Jerusalem for the first time since the 1967 Middle East war and the lack of mention of the PLO in Brezhnev’s comments on the Middle East during the Soviet trade union congress indicate that the Soviets are softening their pro-Arab policy in order to be suggested as an intermediary for Middle East peace talks; Syria and Fatah cooperation to secure an area in Beirut that suffered heavy fighting; the Arab Monetary Fund formally established by 20 Arab countries and the PLO.

## Your Analysis on Syria

DI // Finished Intelligence // 02 May 1977

Dr. Quandt’s response to DI finished intelligence, “The Carter-Asad Meeting: The Syrian Perspective.” Includes referenced memorandum. The memorandum discusses Asad’s possible posture on the negotiations, and the differences between Asad and Sadat in pursuing a Middle East peace.

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 20 May 1977

Likud’s victory in the May 17 national elections.

## Nonmilitary Compensation for an Israeli Territorial Withdrawal

DI // Finished Intelligence // 26 May 1977

The political, cultural, humanitarian and economic compensation Israel expects, assuming that any comprehensive settlement will require Israeli withdrawal to positions near the 1967 borders.

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 27 May 1977

Uncertainties on what the new Israeli government will look like under Begin’s leadership.

## The Soviet Role in the Middle East

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 June 1977

“The Soviets’ economic, military, and political position with the principal Arab states has eroded over the past five years, and shows no sign of early improvement. The low state of relations between the USSR and Egypt stands out as an important failure of Soviet foreign policy under General Secretary Brezhnev.... Soviet leaders want to reconvene the Geneva conference to demonstrate that the USSR plays a central role in Arab-Israeli negotiations. Moscow has neither the desire nor the ability, however, to force the Arabs or Israelis to make the political concessions that will be necessary to restart the conference.”

## Israel, Lebanon

DI // Current Intelligence // 03 June 1977

Begin delays appointment of Moshe Dayan as foreign minister, in turn leading the Democratic Movement for Change to resume negotiations on a coalition, improving Begin’s chances at forming a broadly-based government; the Syrian government tries to promote the Cairo accords which would “lay down ground rules for Palestinian activities in Lebanon.”

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 10 June 1977

Little success in Begin’s attempt to form a broadly-based government; upcoming meeting in Cairo between Egyptian Prime Minister Saleim and his counterpart, Abd al-Ubaydi, to discuss Libyan-Egyptian tensions along the border.



## Egypt-USSR; Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 17 June 1977

Little progress in repairing Soviet-Egyptian relations after Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit to Moscow; Menachem Begin likely to become Israel's prime minister next week.

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 24 June 1977

Israel's parliament formally approves a right-wing coalition government headed by Menachem Begin.

## Discussion Paper for PRC Meeting on Middle East

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 July 1977

"Beyond recognizing that it will be difficult at every stage to produce Israeli or Arab concessions, we cannot predict how successful we will actually be in our efforts. Our strategy, as we go along, will depend to a significant degree on the amount of success we have, however.... To begin with where we are today, the first questions concern preparation for and conduct of the Begin visit. Depending on how the visit comes out, we will then have choice to make in our subsequent strategy."

## Economic Consequences of a Middle East Peace Settlement

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 July 1977

"This paper is a conceptual look at potential economic benefits from genuine peace in the Middle East; it is not an intelligence estimate of what would likely take place with a settlement. Three critical conditions are assumed. The first is a peace settlement acceptable to all sides. The second is that foreign aid will be sufficient to cover all reasonable financial needs. The third is a building of mutual confidence."

## Summary of PRC Meeting on the Middle East

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 05 July 1977

"Two key issues for discussion during Prime Minister Begin's visit will be a framework of agreed principles prior to Geneva and the question of a Palestinian representation in the negotiations. Most of the PRC meeting concentrated on these two issues."

## Leadership Profile: Menachem Begin

DI // Finished Intelligence // 07 July 1977

Brief overview of the political background, accompanied with photo of Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

## Summary of Policy Review Committee Meeting on Middle East

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 12 July 1977

"It was the PRC's consensus that the President should open the meeting with Prime Minister Begin with a broad overview of our strategic assessment and of the basic elements of our policy. It should be clear that we are not trying to impose these views, but that they represent our best judgment on the likely outcome of comprehensive peace negotiations, and are also in our judgment fair to all parties. If Israel can do better in negotiations, we will not be an obstacle."

## DCI Cabinet Briefing—Israel: Economic Prospects

DI // Finished Intelligence // 15 July 1977

"Briefly, we believe that Begin will continue to give overriding priority to defense and that, as a result, the civilian economy will continue to be hamstrung despite large amounts of US aid. Labor shortages and austerity measures will hold growth to a mere two percent or so at best."

## Arafat Message

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 18 July 1977

"Arafat wants following message conveyed to U.S.: He is willing to make a public statement clearly implying PLO's willingness to live in peace with Israel with both Israel and Palestine enjoying mutually acceptable and secure borders. Clarifying use of word 'implying,' he said there would be no possibility of two meanings to his statement."

## Israeli Press Coverage of Begin Visit

DI // Finished Intelligence // 18 July 1977

"We believe that Israeli press reports, citing 'government sources,' accurately reflect the outlines of the closely-held Middle East peace plan that Prime Minister Begin intends to discuss with President Carter. We have no information on the details of Begin's plan that goes beyond articles in the Israeli press or reporting from the US Embassy in Tel Aviv."

## Israel: Economic Prospects

DI // Current Intelligence // 22 July 1977

"Prime Minister Menachem Begin's month-old government, although preoccupied with preparations for possible Middle East peace negotiations, announced an economic program last week-end that closely parallels the budget proposals of the former Labor government—with a few new austerity measures tacked on. The new measures, designed to reduce the 40-percent inflation rate, call for restraint on wage demands and reductions in budget deficits through increased taxes on gasoline, elimination of food subsidies, and minimal cuts in military spending."

## NIE: Middle East Military Balance

DCI/NIC // NIE // 02 August 1977

"Israel has increased its margin of military superiority over the Arabs since the 1973 war. It is currently capable of countering any Arab attempt at either a full-scale or a limited war of attrition and of decisively defeating its opponents on any or all fronts. Israel will retain, and may even somewhat expand, its current margin of military superiority over the next five years despite efforts by the Arabs to improve and expand their armed forces and the potentially greater contributions by peripheral Arab states.... Perhaps the single most important factor bearing upon Middle Eastern developments is the progress of negotiations toward peace. As long as peace negotiations hold some promise of success, Arab leaders will not be under great pressure to initiate a major military operation against Israel. An impasse, however, could lead to the overthrow of one or more of the key Arab leaders and/or push the Arab states toward exercising a military option involving a phased offensive on three fronts executed in conjunction with a Saudi-imposed oil embargo."

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 19 August 1977

"A series of recent actions by the Israeli government underscores Prime Minister Begin's intention to retain permanent control of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip."

## Current PLO Position on 242; Soviet and Arab Advice to PLO on 242

DO // Cable // 20 August 1977

"The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has not finally rejected the idea of announcing acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 which would open an official dialogue with the United States. The prevailing mood within the PLO leadership, however, is increasingly against such an announcement. The Saudis, Egyptians and the Soviets have urged PLO leadership to make a reserved announcement of acceptance of Resolution 242. The Syrians have advised the PLO not to announce acceptance of the resolution unless the United States offers a more tangible quid pro quo than just a PLO/US dialogue."

## Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 229

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 31 August 1977

"We share the concern of Embassy Damascus over the growing criticism of the US and the US peace effort which has appeared in the Syrian press during the last week.... Furthermore, a growing number of Syrians have become convinced that Arab 'flexibility' has gained nothing while the Israeli hardliner has 'created facts' that make the peace process even more difficult. As a consequence, the Syrians may be in the process of developing a strategy to counter the Israelis and not to concede anything more."

## Egypt: Financial Outlook Brightens

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 September 1977

"By 1978 improved export prospects and a compromise economic reform agreement worked out with the International Monetary Fund last spring should alleviate Cairo's current foreign payments program. The agreement, which requires a measure of austerity that the Sadat regime believes will be politically acceptable, should help regularize the flow of Arab aid and reduce the need for stop-gap financing."

## Israel: Foreign Minister Dayan

DI // Current Intelligence // 17 September 1977

"Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan, who meets Monday with President Carter, is poles apart from Prime Minister Begin in temperament. Dayan is a pragmatist and a flexible, resourceful negotiator, while Begin, after more than a generation in opposition, remains an ideologue. Thus far, however, the two men—both strong-willed and independent—have worked well together."

## Israel: Prospects for Stability of the Begin Government

DI // Finished Intelligence // 05 October 1977

"As long as foreign policy overshadows all other issues, the key factor that is likely to affect the stability of Begin's government will be his management of Israeli-US relations. Begin is aware

that he must strike a delicate balance enabling him to avoid a serious crisis with Washington while still opposing major elements of the perceived US peace plan."

## Peace Negotiations and Israeli Coalition Politics

DI // Finished Intelligence // 07 October 1977

"We believe Prime Minister Begin remains very much in charge, despite some reported grumbling within the Israeli cabinet over accepting a united Arab delegation in Geneva. So long as he is convinced that Foreign Minister Dayan is not playing a lone hand or is not going further than Begin himself would approve in demonstrating tactical flexibility, the prime minister's preeminent authority will enable him to override any objections from hardliners in the cabinet."

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 28 October 1977

"Prime Minister Begin's ruling coalition gained a much more comfortable majority in the Israeli Knesset this week when the moderate Democratic Movement for Change joined the government, boosting its margin from four to 19 seats. The broadening of the coalition, which was previously limited to Begin's right-wing Likud grouping and two religious parties, should strengthen the ability of Begin and Foreign Minister Dayan to control Israel's tactical approach to peace negotiations."

## Comments by Soviet Ambassador in Cairo Concerning Significance of Visit of Foreign Ministry Middle East Department Chief Sytenko to Arab Countries

DO // Cable // 03 November 1977

"[Less than one line redacted] that the visit of Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Middle East Department Chief Mikhail Sytenko to the Arab world in November represented a potential shift in Soviet policy vis-à-vis Middle East peace negotiations.... The 1 October 1977 joint Soviet-American statement on the bases for a Middle East peace whetted Moscow's appetite to play a greater role in Middle East negotiations."

## Factors Affecting Saudi Arabia's Position on an OPEC Oil Price Increase

DI // Finished Intelligence // 10 November 1977

"Given the above factors and the present climate of pessimism in the Arab world over the prospects for a Geneva conference, we believe it highly unlikely that further US démarches to Saudi Arabia aimed at preventing an oil price increase at Caracas would be successful. Prince Fahd told Secretary Blumenthal that the Saudis are prepared to argue initially for a price freeze but he implied that the Saudis would be forced to accept some increase because they could not be sure the other OPEC members would agree to a price freeze. A revised US démarche to Saudi Arabia to hold down any increase in oil prices at Caracas would be unnecessary expenditure of political capital because the Saudis probably would work on their own to hold any price increase to the 5-10 percent range."



## Israel: Begin’s Speech to Egypt

DI // Current Intelligence // 12 November 1977

“Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s radio broadcast to Egypt yesterday was almost certainly an attempt to wrest the propaganda initiative from President Sadat and demonstrate that Israel is no less interested than Egypt in peace. Egypt has characterized Begin’s broadcast as ‘unsuccessful’ because his remarks were confined to Egypt.”

## USSR-Middle East: Response

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 November 1977

“The USSR has responded negatively to the current Egyptian-Israeli dialogue [less than one line redacted]. Moscow is clearly concerned that recent developments will enable the US to resume its role as the major participant in step-by-step talks from which the Soviets would be excluded.”

## Egypt-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 18 November 1977

“Egyptian President Sadat’s startling proposal on 9 November to plead the Arab cause before the Israeli parliament in person—perhaps only intended as a rhetorical flourish when delivered—this week became in turn a serious possibility and then a likelihood. Israeli Prime Minister Begin quickly issued a formal invitation and Sadat agreed to travel to Jerusalem this weekend.”

## Israel: Euphoria and Suspicion

DI // Current Intelligence // 18 November 1977

“President Sadat’s impending visit has generated euphoria in Israel, reflecting a deep desire for both peace and Arab acceptance. By breaking the Arab taboo to meet Israeli leaders in Jerusalem, the Egyptian President has enhanced—however tenuously—his credibility and has put a dent in the deep-seated Israeli distrust of the Arabs. In Egypt, reaction is shifting from enthusiasm to apprehension that Sadat may have conceded too much to Israel.”

## Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 295

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 19 November 1977

“Arab reaction to the Sadat visit has become increasingly hostile and violent: anti-Sadat demonstrations broke out in Beirut and several Libyan cities; Egypt air offices were bombed in Beirut and Damascus; Palestinian demonstrators attacked the Egyptian Embassy in Athens, killing at least one person; and one was killed and two wounded in a rocket attack on the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut.”

## Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments, No. 296

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 20 November 1977

“Reaction in the Arab world to Sadat’s visit generally continues to be hostile. Iraq, Libya and the Rejectionist Palestinians appear to be promoting much of the anti-Sadat actions throughout the world which include: anti-Egyptian demonstrations in Tunis,

Beirut, Baghdad, Algeria, Bucharest, Dacca, Karachi, New Delhi, London, Paris, Bonn, Madrid, and the sacking and burning of the Egyptian Embassy in Tripoli; massive demonstrations occurring in Lebanon, Iraq, and Libya; the unprecedented cancelling of official ceremonies marking the Muslim holy day celebration in Iraq; the breaking of diplomatic relations with Egypt by Qadhafi and the reported withdrawal of 15,000 Libyans from Egypt.”

## International Reaction to the Sadat and Begin Speeches

DI // Finished Intelligence // 21 November 1977

“Except in the Arab world, international reaction to the speeches yesterday by Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin has thus far been minimal. Arab commentary on the speeches has followed rather predictable patterns. Syria has castigated Sadat for acknowledging the ‘existence of Israel’ and Begin for ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. Iraqi and Libyan commentary has been particularly harsh. One militant official of the Palestine Liberation Organization has also criticized Sadat for ‘turning his back’ on the Arabs and Begin for failing to mention the PLO.”

## Middle East: Sadat’s Knesset Speech

DI // Current Intelligence // 21 November 1977

“Egyptian President Sadat’s speech to the Israeli Knesset contained no departures from Egypt’s terms for a peace settlement, nor did it propose any new specific ways for negotiating a settlement. True [to] his promises before undertaking his historic visit, the Egyptian President delivered a direct forceful restatement of the primary Arab requirements for a peace agreement, bowing to Israeli sensitivities only in avoiding, when possible, language—such as direct references to the Palestine Liberation Organization—that would have added a contentious tone to the occasion. Attention is now focusing on the private talks between Sadat and Begin and the peace proposals each side is expected to offer.”

## Syria and Sadat’s Israel Trip

DI // CIA Finished Intelligence // 25 November 1977

“As this memorandum was being typed, we received the attached press ticker indicating that Syria may have opted out of negotiations. With this little to go on, however, we are reluctant to conclude that Syria will definitely not go to Geneva. It is possible, for instance, that the Syrian information minister was merely stating a belief that Arab disarray makes Geneva unlikely now; this does not necessarily preclude the possibility that the Arabs could ease their differences and reverse tracks toward Geneva again.”

## Egypt-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 November 1977

“Egyptian President Sadat’s bold peace initiative in visiting Israel this past week has subjected the rigidities of the Arab-Israeli dispute to a major shock treatment comparable to the one produced by his equally bold war initiative in 1973.”

## Middle East: Further Reactions

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 November 1977

“The Israeli public, while still euphoric over Egyptian President Sadat’s visit, seems disappointed that its own government did not rise to the occasion and match Sadat’s gesture. As a result, the government is on the spot to respond soon in some way that will further boost peace efforts. On the Arab side, the Saudis reportedly will quietly support Sadat’s initiative, and moderates within the Palestine Liberation Organization apparently are attempting to prevent the PLO stand from being overly harsh.”

## Popularity in Damascus of Sadat’s Initiative to the Israelis; Popular Syrian Belief that Asad Near Future will Probably Modify His Opposition to Sadat’s Initiative

DO // Cable // 26 November 1977

“Public opinion in Damascus greatly has favored the visit by President Sadat of Egypt to Jerusalem and Sadat’s efforts to end the Arab-Israeli dispute. Syrians of all walks of life—lawyers, shopkeepers, farmers, professional men and even a segment of the Syrian military (the Sunnis)—believe that Sadat has made an important breakthrough towards peace and that he should now be supported in his initiatives by other Arab states.”

## Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments, No. 305

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 28 November 1977

“By seizing the initiative in the peace process, Sadat has created very serious problems for all the states involved. For the first time in several months each of the parties is being forced to reevaluate basic policy positions and to reformulate their disposition toward a settlement. Sadat apparently believes that he is secure at home and has sufficient influence within the Arab world to force the pace of negotiations so that they do not bog down on procedural issues.”

## Middle East: Diplomacy

DI // Current Intelligence // 29 November 1977

“Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s speech to the Knesset yesterday contained no surprises or hints of greater flexibility. Begin did little more than recount the public events of the past two weeks and reiterate his desire for peace and for negotiations with all of the Arabs, except the Palestine Liberation Organization.”

## Syria: Asad’s Mideast Position

DI // Current Intelligence // 01 December 1977

“Syrian President Asad, by reacting so vehemently against Egypt’s latest peace initiatives, is attempting to rally support around himself as the only proper defender of Arab interests. He has not, however, won the widespread sympathy he had apparently expected. Although Asad may be able to obstruct the Egyptian initiative, he is now caught uncomfortably between the moderate and the rejectionist Arab camps—unwilling either to condone the conciliatory attitude of one or to swallow the negative views of the other.”

## Iraq: Summitry and Rejectionism

DI // Current Intelligence // 01 December 1977

“Iraq’s call for an Arab summit meeting to be held next week in Baghdad is in part an attempt both to force Syria to oppose negotiations with Israel and to discredit President Asad. Iraq has sent Asad an invitation to attend the Baghdad summit—described as an attempt to reconcile Arab differences and unify the rejectionist states and the Palestinians—but the terms Iraq would impose on a Syrian acceptance and reconciliation are probably unacceptable to Asad.”

## Arab States-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 02 December 1977

“Egyptian Prime Minister Anwar Sadat this week pressed his initiative for a Middle East settlement, receiving in return new assurances of cooperation from the Israelis—who would be happy if it leads to a separate peace with Egypt—and new denunciations from Arab critics anxious to block such a result.”

## Israel: Seizing Opportunity

DI // Current Intelligence // 02 December 1977

“Israeli leaders seem convinced that Egyptian President Sadat might be willing to conclude a separate agreement with Israel if his present initiative fails because of Arab rather than Israeli intransigence. As a result, several senior cabinet ministers [less than one line redacted] are urging Prime Minister Begin to show some genuine flexibility in responding to Sadat’s overture for an overall settlement, presumably lest the chances for even a separate agreement be lost.”

## Arab States: Tripoli Meeting

DI // Current Intelligence // 02 December 1977

“The heads of state of the radical Arab nations and Palestinian leaders convened in Libya yesterday to denounce Egypt’s peace initiatives and immediately postponed their meeting until today. The Soviets continue to support a resumption of the Geneva conference and thus have not been outspoken in their support of the Tripoli conference.”

## Egypt: Anti-Soviet Moves

DI // Current Intelligence // 05 December 1977

“Egypt’s recall for consultations of its ambassador to the USSR underscores President Sadat’s displeasure with Moscow’s refusal to attend the Cairo preparatory conference.”

## Arab States: Tripoli Summit Landing

DI // Current Intelligence // 05 December 1977

“The Libyan-hosted summit of Arab states opposed to Egypt’s initiatives toward Israel appears to have ended, and a final communiqué reportedly will be issued later today. There apparently has been considerable dissension among the participants. The reported walkout by the Iraqi representative suggests that the final results of the conference may prove to be milder than some radical Arabs had wished. Moreover, a militant statement announced by the Palestinians in Tripoli yesterday is likely to be sidestepped by Palestine Liberation Organization chief Yasir Arafat.”



## Middle East Update: Briefing

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 05 December 1977

“Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and his subsequent drive for further face-to-face negotiations with the Israelis have resulted in an intense, emotional and enthusiastic response from the Arab people, not only in those states supporting Egypt but also in such countries as Syria and occupied Palestine. The slogan of the Sadat supporters is ‘Peace—not War,’ but it is assumed by all (including Sadat) that ‘Peace’ means one in which the occupied Arab lands are returned to Arab control. The dramatic offer which Sadat is making on the Arab side is to accept Israel as a friendly Middle Eastern state with full diplomatic recognition and secure, recognized boundaries.”

## Arab States: Egyptian Reaction

DI // Current Intelligence // 06 December 1977

“Egypt reacted sharply to the Tripoli communiqué by announcing yesterday that it will sever diplomatic relations with Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and South Yemen. The move could have the effect of forcing the summit participants to adhere to anti-Egyptian measures that they might otherwise have circumvented.”

## Egypt-USSR: Further Action

DI // Current Intelligence // 07 December 1977

“Egyptian President Sadat told US officials yesterday that he intends to take ‘further action,’ which will be announced today, against the USSR. Sadat did not indicate what he had in mind. In his current mood he may announce a full diplomatic break with Moscow. It seems more likely, however, that Sadat’s recent public commitment to work toward reconvening the Geneva conference will constrain him from further compromising the Soviets’ role as co-chairman of the conference.”

## West Bank: Opinion on Sadat’s Plan

DI // Current Intelligence // 08 December 1977

“Egyptian President Sadat has been unable to get West Bank and Palestinian leaders to endorse his peace initiatives publicly, despite significant support for his efforts among Palestinians living in the occupied territories. The local leaders want to avoid further divisions in the Palestinian movement, and they are skeptical about Israel’s willingness to withdraw to its 1967 borders.”

## Egypt-USSR: Expulsion Reaction

DI // Current Intelligence // 08 December 1977

“The Soviets have thus far not reacted to Egyptian President Sadat’s move yesterday to close their consulates and cultural centers.”

## Arab States-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 09 December 1977

“The deepening splits in Arab ranks over Egyptian President Sadat’s trip to Israel have prompted those Arab states caught in the middle to intensify their mediation efforts. Visits by Jordan’s King Husayn to Syria and Egypt on 7 and 8 December and by Syrian President Asad to Saudi Arabia on 8 December are not likely,

however, to produce any reconciliation between Cairo and its hard-line Arab critics, including Syria, in the near future. Sadat will probably open the preparatory Cairo peace conference on 14 December without the public backing of any Arab state, and with only Israel and the US behind his new approach to peace negotiations.”

## USSR-US-Middle East: Comments

DI // Current Intelligence // 09 December 1977

“Comments in Soviet media yesterday on developments in the Middle East indicate considerable unease over Secretary of State Vance’s visit to the area. A TASS statement in English complained of ‘definite circles’ in the US administration ‘set on pressuring’ Arab states to support both the meeting in Cairo and direct contacts between Egypt and Israel.”

## USSR-Middle East: Criticism

DI // Current Intelligence // 10 December 1977

“The USSR has apparently decided at least for now to soft-pedal its criticism of Egyptian President Sadat [less than one line redacted]. The timing of this tactical shift suggests that the sudden closure of the Soviet consulates and cultural offices in Egypt convinced Moscow to moderate its public positions. The shift follows discussions between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Undersecretary Habib in Moscow last Sunday and Monday.”

## Jordan: Husayn and the West Bank

DI // Current Intelligence // 10 December 1977

“King Husayn has indicated in recent interviews that Jordan would assume an active role in West Bank negotiations only if Israel is prepared to offer him substantial territorial concessions. Husayn’s remarks are probably designed to impress on Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat that he must have firm indications of Israeli willingness to pull back from most of the West Bank before he will take the substantial risks involved in participating in the Cairo conference or a truncated Geneva Conference.”

## West Bank: Palestinians to Cairo

DI // Current Intelligence // 10 December 1977

“Delegations of conservative Palestinian representatives from Gaza and the West Bank are traveling to Cairo this weekend to endorse Egyptian President Sadat’s peace initiatives. These delegations are probably too tainted by association with Israel and Jordan to represent any significant body of Palestinian opinion.”

## Egypt-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 December 1977

“The preliminary Arab-Israeli peace conference called by Egyptian President Sadat opened in Cairo on 14 December with only the Egyptians, from the Arab side, sitting down with the delegations representing Israel, the US, and the UN. The talks nevertheless are likely to sustain, at least for a time, the momentum of the Egyptian leader’s peace drive, which was his primary purpose in convoking the conference.”

## Israel: Cairo Conference Begins

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 December 1977

“Hopes are running high in Israel as the Cairo conference begins. Although the public remains in the dark on where the negotiations are headed, there is a general feeling that at least a settlement with Egypt is within reach.”

## Egypt: Financial Implications

DI // Current Intelligence // 17 December 1977

“Egyptian President Sadat’s diplomatic initiatives could create serious financial difficulties for Egypt, if Egypt’s financial benefactors conclude that he is bent on a separate agreement with Israel. Egypt needs an additional \$500 million during the first half of 1978 to finance essential imports and debt service payments falling due. Egypt would be in for another financial squeeze if Arab support were not forthcoming.”

## Arab States: Reactions to Begin

DI // Current Intelligence // 20 December 1977

“The initial Arab public reaction to press accounts of Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s new proposals for home rule on the West Bank and Gaza has generally been negative. Arab commentators have complained that Begin’s plan fails to deal with the nearly two million Palestinian refugees living outside of Israel and the occupied territories. The Arab press has also noted that the plan continues Israeli control over East Jerusalem.”

## Brezhnev Letter: Brezhnev’s Health, Gromyko on Middle East

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 22 December 1977

“Gromyko on the Middle East: Gromyko said he would like to comment on the Middle East situation, quite independently of the president’s letter. He had received a report from the Soviet embassy in Washington of Secretary Vance’s recent conversation with Dobrynin on this topic, and in that context wished to state the following: the Soviet Union is not accustomed to accepting or approving agreements concluded without the participation of the Soviet Union; this is not our way of conducting business, and we don’t like this practice.”

## Egypt-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 23 December 1977

“The pace of Middle Eastern diplomacy quickened this past week with Prime Minister Begin’s sudden trip to Washington and the subsequent announcement that Begin and President Sadat would meet in Ismailia on Christmas Day for talks on Israeli peace proposals. Begin’s decision to brief President Carter is being interpreted in some quarters in Israel as an attempt to reestablish close coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv on peace efforts.”

## Egypt-Israel: Summit Results

DI // Current Intelligence // 27 December 1977

“The initial assessment of the US Embassy in Cairo is that the summit meeting in Ismailia was less than a success for Egyptian President Sadat. Although both he and Israeli Prime Minister

Begin are seeking to project a positive image of the two-day session and are pointing to upcoming negotiations at ministerial levels, the Egyptian President appeared to have had little success in modifying any significant points of Begin’s comprehensive peace plan, many details of which had been published before the summit negotiations began on Sunday.”

## Egypt-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 30 December 1977

“Sadat was unable to get agreement on a ‘declaration of principles,’ for which he had been holding out hope right up to the beginning of the meeting. The most serious disagreements were over the future of the West Bank and the Palestinian Arabs, which Sadat described as the ‘crux of the whole problem.’ The question of an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai appears less intractable, although many details are yet to be worked out.”

## Syria: Asad’s Opposition to Sadat’s Peace Initiative

DI // Current Intelligence // 30 December 1977

“Syrian President Asad has reacted to Egyptian President Sadat’s readiness to deal directly with the Israelis with genuine shock and disapproval. The symbolism of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem aroused similar distaste in some other Arab capitals, but the more moderate of these states have come to recognize the opportunity the visit opened for further movement toward peace negotiations. Asad has not. He regards Sadat’s visit not merely as a blunder to be criticized and later forgiven but as a major concession to the ‘enemy.’ Asad is particularly incensed that Sadat is looking beyond a nonbelligerency treaty with Israel toward a true reconciliation. Asad is not ready for a peace that would also bring normalization of Arab-Israeli diplomatic relations, and he cannot accept with equanimity the fact that Sadat is.”

## President Sadat’s [less than one line redacted] Reaction to President Carter’s TV Comments on 28 December Regarding the West Bank

DO // Cable // 01 January 1978

“[Less than one line redacted] Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat made the following comments regarding U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s remarks on television concerning the West Bank. Sadat said he was not really angry over incident, as he realized both he and President Carter had been caught a bit off guard.... The truth of the matter, Sadat confided, was that he really didn’t have any problems with the solution President Carter referred to in his 28 December remarks: allowing the West Bank to come under either Israeli or Jordanian control in a final settlement.”

## Arab States-USSR

DI // Current Intelligence // 06 January 1978

“As the Egyptians and Israelis make preparations for the scheduled meetings later this month of the ministerial-level political and military committees created by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin at their Christmas meeting in Ismailia, Arab opponents of the peace move have stepped up their efforts to derail it. The hard-line Arabs are consulting about holding another summit



conference among themselves to try to work out more effective tactics against Sadat’s peace initiatives. Palestinian spokesmen have raised the specter of further military or terrorist operations if the PLO is ignored in any future settlement. Syria, the key member of the anti-Sadat grouping, apparently is seeking new military aid from the USSR, which has launched its own vigorous campaign to counter the Egyptian-Israeli contacts.”

### Egypt-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence //13 January 1978

“An Israeli delegation headed by Defense Minister Weizman arrived in Cairo on 11 January to meet with Egyptian counterparts in the first session of a joint military committee, one of two such working groups agreed to at the Ismailia summit.... A political committee, with Foreign Ministers Dayan and Kamil heading their respective countries’ delegations and attended by Secretary Vance, convenes in Jerusalem on 16 January.”

### Egypt-Israel: Sadat Recalls Kamil

DI // Current Intelligence //19 January 1978

“Egyptian President Sadat’s recall yesterday of Foreign Minister Kamil from the political talks in Jerusalem underscores his frustration with the slow pace of peace negotiations and is part of his effort to increase pressure on Israel to alter its approach. Sadat also called an extraordinary session of the People’s Assembly for Saturday; in the past he has used this forum to make dramatic announcements.”

### Egypt-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 20 January 1978

“Prospects for a negotiated peace settlement in the Middle East dimmed this week when Egypt’s President Sadat, alleging Israeli intransigence, broke off talks between foreign ministers in Jerusalem after only two days of meetings.”

### Israel: Begin’s Knesset Speech

DI // Current Intelligence // 24 January 1978

“Israeli Prime Minister Begin in his Knesset speech yesterday left open the possibility of an early resumption of the military talks in Cairo. Begin hinged Israeli approval of such a resumption on President Sadat putting an end to the ‘anti-Semitic’ campaign in the Egyptian press. Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamil dismissed the charges of anti-Semitism, but suggested that both sides could ‘calmly redefine their stands’ and may resume negotiations.”

### Egypt: Negotiating Tactics

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 January 1978

“Egyptian President Sadat appears in no hurry to resume talks with Israel, preferring for the moment to keep alive the threat—implicit in his dramatic action last week, when he recalled his delegation from Jerusalem—that negotiations will fail unless Israel and the US modify their positions and approaches to the peace process. Timing is all-important to Sadat now; he must decide when he has secured maximum advantage from the current standstill in talks, yet he must be careful that the situation does not deteriorate into a permanent breakdown.”

### Egypt-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 27 January 1978

“Egyptian President Sadat seems content for now to play out his gamble.... So far, Israeli Prime Minister Begin has not publicly moderated his position and most Israelis agree that Sadat’s tactics should be answered by Israeli firmness.”

### USSR-US-Middle East: Harsh Line

DI // Current Intelligence // 27 January 1978

“The current pause in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations has not eased Soviet concerns about the possibility of ‘separate’ agreements in the Middle East. Soviet spokesmen have conceded that Moscow’s position has become ‘more complicated’ as a result of President Sadat’s initiatives, and Soviet commentary has become significantly more critical of the role of the US. Moscow clearly anticipates additional Egyptian-Israeli contacts and may foresee less favorable conditions for Soviet-US relations as a result.”

### Israel: Contradictory Attitudes

DI // Current Intelligence // 27 January 1978

“Most Israelis support Prime Minister Begin’s decision to delay the resumption of the military talks in Cairo as an appropriate and justified response to President Sadat’s pressure tactics and to what the Israelis view as a tough, unyielding Egyptian negotiating stance. This consensus, however, masks some uneasiness in Israel over Begin’s handling of the negotiations and an ambivalence on the issues of Israeli settlements in the Sinai.”

### Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 364

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 02 February 1978

“Despite the avoidance of public speculation about its outcome, it is becoming apparent that he hopes for some ‘dramatic and courageous act’ on the part of the US commensurate with his trip to Jerusalem. Against this background, there are suggestions from Sadat’s entourage that he is giving some consideration to pulling back from his initiative.”

### Arab States

DI // Current Intelligence // 02 February 1978

“The second summit of hard-line Arab states opposed to Egyptian President Sadat’s peace initiative begins today in Algiers. Algerian President Boumedienne, Syrian President Asad, South Yemeni party chief Abd al-Fattah Ismail, and probably Libyan President Qadhafi will attend. The Palestinian delegation will represent all shades of opinion and may include Yasir Arafat as well as radical leader George Habbash.”

### Egypt-Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 03 February 1978

“Egypt’s President Sadat caps his diplomatic campaign to rally international support for Egypt’s position in peace negotiations by visiting the US and five European countries over the next 10 days. Private and public opinion in Egypt is pessimistic that this largely public diplomacy will produce a substantive breakthrough.”

### China-Egypt: Support for Sadat

DI // Current Intelligence // 06 February 1978

“Peking has officially endorsed Egyptian President Sadat’s Middle East peace initiative. The endorsement came in a statement by Premier Hua Kuo-feng broadcast on Saturday by the official Chinese news agency.”

### Arab States

DI // Current Intelligence // 10 February 1978

“The summit meeting of hard-line Arab states in Algiers late last week produced no public evidence that the participants... came up with an effective way to challenge seriously Egyptian President Sadat’s peace initiative.”

### USSR-Egypt: Establishing a Dialogue

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 February 1978

“The Soviets are testing Egyptian willingness to establish a “constructive dialogue” between the two countries.... Some improvement in relations with Egypt is certainly desired by the Soviets. They continue to view that country as the most important Arab state politically and are anxious to end their exclusion from Middle East peace negotiations.”

### Israel: Right-wingers to Protest

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 February 1978

“Right-wing Israeli activists, who oppose Prime Minister Begin’s peace proposals, are planning to challenge the government’s West Bank settlements policy on Sunday. Rabbi Meir Kahane, a leader of the Jewish Defense League, has announced that his group and some Gush Emunim followers will attempt to take over a former hospital in the old Jewish quarter of the West Bank town of Hebron.”

### Arab States: Concern over Palestinians

DI // Current Intelligence // 17 February 1978

“Some 2 million Palestinian Arabs are living outside the area they consider their homeland, the bulk of them in four countries—Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Kuwait. These countries are concerned that a Middle East settlement—even if it provides some autonomy for the 1 million Palestinians now living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—may not provide for the resettlement of the Palestinians abroad.”

### West Bank: A Prospering Economy

DI // Current Intelligence // 17 February 1978

“The economy of the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan River has been prospering in the past few years—in sharp contrast to that of Israel prosper, which is only slowly emerging from a prolonged recession.”

### Egypt: Financial Outlook

DI // Current Intelligence // 17 February 1978

“Egypt’s financial outlook has improved substantially during the last few months. Late last year, we estimated that Cairo’s unfinanced

payments gap would be roughly \$1 billion annually through 1979. We now believe that soaring private transfers and favorable oil production prospects could more than halve the gap over the next two years. Moreover, despite President Sadat’s peace initiative, the Saudi-sponsored Gulf Organization for the Development of Egypt appears willing to provide substantial import financing.”

### Egypt: Aftermath and Reactions

DI // Current Intelligence // 21 February 1978

“The failure of Egyptian troops to capture the terrorists who assassinated Yusif al-Sibai, the editor of Al-Ahram, and seized hostages on Cyprus has embarrassed Egypt’s President Sadat and other leaders, and seems likely to damage the President’s prestige. We believe, however, that the assassination and bungled commando operation will ultimately have little impact on Sadat’s efforts to provide for Palestinian self determination in any settlement with Israel.”

### Egypt-Cyprus: Relations Broken

DI // Current Intelligence // 23 February 1978

“Egypt announced yesterday the breaking of relations with Cyprus and hinted at the possibility of further retaliation for the killing of Egyptian commandos at Larnaca airport on Sunday.... President Sadat expressed his personal bitterness to Ambassador Eilts yesterday at the funeral for the 15 Egyptian commandos killed in the Larnaca incident.”

### Israel: Settlement Politics

DI // Current Intelligence // 23 February 1978

“The Israeli Cabinet continues to try to resolve its policy differences on future settlements, but it may be unable to reach an agreed position when the cabinet addresses the settlements question again this weekend. The US Embassy in Tel Aviv believes that even if a policy decision is made, it will not be made public. Whether Prime Minister Begin decides in favor of proceeding with settlement activity, a general stand-still, or some middle course, the cabinet dissension that emerged during last Monday’s special session is likely to continue to bedevil him.”

### Middle East-Africa

DI // Current Intelligence // 24 February 1978

“The assassination of Sibai has led to public condemnations in Egypt of Palestinians of all stripes... Sadat must consider a number of political imperatives, such as the need to include other Arabs in peace negotiations, and is unlikely to reverse his policies because of a single terrorist attack by opponents of those policies.”

### Israel: Negotiating Position

DI // Current Intelligence // 28 February 1978

“Public statements last weekend by Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan and Minister without Portfolio Landau suggest that Prime Minister Begin will find it difficult to modify his negotiating position and may adopt a hard, unyielding line during talks in Washington in mid-March.”



## Egypt-Palestinians: Media Attack

DI // Current Intelligence // 28 February 1978

“Egypt’s semi-controlled media continue harshly to condemn the Palestinians following the killing of Egyptian editor Sibai in Nicosia in mid-February. Thus far, Cairo’s only reprisal is Prime Minister Salim’s announcement yesterday that Egypt will strip Palestinians within its borders of some special privileges they have enjoyed for over 20 years. The media, however, hint at more drastic retaliation.”

## Palestinians: Terrorism Increase

DI // Current Intelligence // 02 March 1978

“Palestinians of various political stripes apparently have attempted to increase the level of their terrorist operations on the West Bank and in Israel during the past three months. A substantial number of incidents have occurred since early December, including the assassination of at least three Palestinians accused of ‘collaborating’ with Israel. Israeli antiterrorist measures often are successful but cannot prevent all Palestinian operations.”

## Egypt-Palestinians

DI // Current Intelligence // 03 March 1978

“Egypt’s angry reaction to Palestinian involvement in the Sibai killing includes the suggestion that Cairo is reviewing its recognition of Yasir Arafat as leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its acceptance of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians.”

## Israel: Rising Labor Unrest

DI // Current Intelligence // 03 March 1978

“The Israeli Government faces rising labor unrest that could place additional strains on the ruling coalition. Prime Minister Begin probably will soon be forced to devote more attention to domestic problems in order to avoid a further erosion in the unity and prestige of his government.”

## Four Scenarios for the Egyptian-Israeli Talks

DI // Finished Intelligence // 13 March 1978

“The Egyptian-Israeli talks are foundering. Having been unable to bridge their differences over the principles that are to govern a ‘comprehensive’ settlement, the two sides have also lost momentum toward an agreement on Sinai arrangements. This memorandum explores the consequences of four possible outcomes.”

## Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 411

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 24 March 1978

“Weizman, in a Maariv interview published today, called for the establishment of a ‘peace coalition’ government. This interview, which Weizman told our Chargé yesterday was given without Begin’s knowledge, constitutes a major political challenge to the Prime Minister. Weizman’s growing discontent with what he regards as an excessively hard line by Begin and his steadily rising apprehension that the chance for peace with Egypt may be lost because of Begin’s rigidity, are coming to a head in the wake of what is widely perceived in Israel as Begin’s unsuccessful visit to the US.”

## Sadat’s Views

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 24 March 1978

“Sadat has expressed a willingness to play a role in any interim arrangements worked out for Gaza, and would support a similar Jordanian role in the West Bank. He has mentioned this to us on several occasions, along with his acceptance of a limited and well-defined Israeli security presence during the interim period. Sadat has not implied that he sees a permanent joint Israeli-Arab administration as a viable solution for the West Bank and Gaza... Sadat has virtually given up hope that Begin will show the imagination and flexibility needed for peace talks to move forward.”

## Israel: National Unity Government

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 March 1978

“Defense Minister Weizman’s proposal that the opposition Labor Party join the Likud coalition to form a national unity government is, in fact, political camouflage for a serious challenge designed to upstage Prime Minister Begin’s leadership. Despite Weizman’s protestations that his plan is meant to shore up Begin’s resistance to US pressure on peace issues, Weizman clearly hopes to supplant Begin as the leader of a broadened government.”

## Egypt: Reaction to Begin Visit

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 March 1978

“Egyptian officials are pleased with President Carter’s firmness on key issues and his refusal to be diverted by events in Lebanon. They are somber and apprehensive, however, over the future and what can be done to restore momentum to the peace process.”

## Israel: Rallying Knesset Support

DI // Current Intelligence // 29 March 1978

“Israeli Prime Minister Begin is likely to give an impassioned defense of his peace proposals before the Knesset today in an effort to orchestrate another show of coalition solidarity in the face of sharp differences with the US. Begin has already had some success in rallying public support and blaming the US for the ‘failure’ of his talks in Washington.”

## Arab States: Solidarity Moves

DI // Current Intelligence // 30 March 1978

“The Arab League Foreign Ministers, meeting in Cairo this week, have renewed the mandate for the Syrian-dominated Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon and called for Arab solidarity. An editorial published last week by an authoritative Syrian newspaper suggests that Syrian President Asad is cautiously preparing for a reconciliation with Egyptian President Sadat.”

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 31 March 1978

“After gaining a display of unanimity by the cabinet last weekend, Begin orchestrated a strong show of support in the Knesset on 29 March for his negotiating position, and sent Defense Minister Weizman to Cairo to explore prospects for resuming direct negotiations. Begin doubtless hoped not only to probe Egyptian President Sadat’s intentions but also to use the visit to counter

criticism from the opposition Labor Party that he has let the chance for peace with Egypt slip through his fingers because of his inflexibility.”

## Egypt-Israel: Weizman Trip

DI // Current Intelligence // 01 April 1978

“The lack of progress during Israeli Defense Minister Weizman’s trip to Cairo on Thursday and Friday cannot have come as a surprise to either side. Both the Israeli and Egyptian governments played the visit primarily for its domestic and international impact, although they share a genuine interest in keeping alive their channel of communication through Weizman.”

## Israel: Criticism of Begin Peace Proposals

DI // Finished Intelligence // 07 April 1978

“Perhaps 25,000 Israelis, mainly middle-class Ashkenazi Jews of European origin sympathetic to Labor and the DMC, demonstrated last week in Tel Aviv in favor of greater government flexibility in seeking to overcome the impasse with the Egyptians. If this or similar movements build up momentum they could have a significant impact in swaying public opinion and strengthening the hand of moderates who favor a more flexible approach to negotiations.”

## Israel: Government’s Popularity

DI // Current Intelligence // 07 April 1978

“Israel’s sharp differences with the US and the dimming prospects for a negotiated settlement with Egypt do not appear to have substantially affected the core of Prime Minister Begin’s public support.”

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 14 April 1978

“The emergence in recent weeks of a movement in Israel that favors more flexible peace proposals, and the government’s sponsorship of a counter organization, have had the effect of undermining the solidarity that the government has sought to foster and may give rise to a more substantive national debate on the Arab-Israeli peace process.”

## Jerusalem: Some Aspects of a Complex Problem

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 May 1978

“For the first time in some years, hope for progress toward a political solution was offered by the diplomatic initiative begun by President Sadat with his visit to Israel in November 1977. It has become apparent in the months following the Sadat visit, however, that a number of fundamental issues must be resolved before the parties will be ready to even consider the Jerusalem question. Nevertheless, in order to reach an overall Middle East settlement, at some point they will be forced to reach an understanding on the ultimate status of the city. This paper assumes that some measure of agreement will be reached on the other aspects of the Arab-Israeli dispute and that such an agreement will provide for the return to Arab control of at least that portion of the West Bank between Jerusalem and the Jordan River. It is not intended to suggest any solution to the Jerusalem problem, but rather to outline its dimensions and to identify those factors that must be considered in any proposed settlement.”

## Egypt

DI // Current Intelligence // 05 May 1978

“With his peace initiative stalled, Egyptian President Sadat has begun to focus more intently on the troubled domestic scene, where public dissatisfaction with his government and dissension within his own Cabinet have been growing in recent weeks. This week he ordered some Cabinet changes and promised other measures aimed at defusing criticism, but these steps seem unlikely to dispel the malaise that has settled over Egypt.”

## Israel: Coalition Dissension

DI // Current Intelligence // 09 May 1978

“Some ranking members of Israel’s Democratic Movement for Change, the largest party in the government after Prime Minister Begin’s Likud, are pressing their leadership to pull the party out of the coalition because of Begin’s hard line on peace negotiations.”

## Israel: Interview with Chief of Staff

DI // Current Intelligence // 15 May 1978

“Israel’s new Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, has stirred up a public controversy by asserting in a television interview on Thursday that the Arabs are still bent on destroying Israel and that Israel must retain both the West Bank and the Golan Heights. The US Embassy in Tel Aviv does not believe Eitan’s remarks signal a hardening in the Israeli negotiating position, but that he was restating—in more forceful terms—the government’s stand.”

## Egypt: Reactions to Crackdown

DI // Current Intelligence // 19 May 1978

“The targets of Egyptian President Sadat’s crackdown on both the political left and right have labeled the referendum he plans Sunday unconstitutional and have vowed to fight back, if necessary ‘in the streets.’ The government, meanwhile, is trying to marshal support for the vote and may already have taken legal steps preparatory to dissolving one of Egypt’s three ‘official’ parties, the party of the left. Sadat is likely to have his way, but his course is not without danger.”

## Egypt: Referendum Results

DI // Current Intelligence // 22 May 1978

“Egypt’s voters predictably answered ‘yes’ yesterday to President Sadat’s proposal to ‘purify’ Egypt’s political life. The voting on his referendum containing six principles governing political behavior was not marred by violence. The main question remaining is how harshly Sadat will apply his mandate.”

## DCI Discussion/Dinner on Personalities and Politics, 31 May 1978

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 25 May 1978

“You are invited to participate in a Discussion/Dinner hosted by Admiral Turner in his Conference Room on May 31. The discussion will be concerned with the influence of personality factors on political behavior [less than one line redacted]. Jerrold Post will open the discussion with brief remarks.”



## Succession in Egypt: The Process, Problems, and Possible Consequences

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 June 1978

“An undercurrent of unrest that has been building in Egypt over the stalemated peace process, new prohibitions on political activity, and continuing economic dislocations have given rise to questions about President Sadat’s tenure, and thus about the country’s future. In our view, Sadat remains in control of events and can still draw on substantial assets, most notably his political acumen. He is a master at manipulating the myriad contradictions and pressures that beset Egypt. Nonetheless, the central role played by Egypt in Middle East politics puts a premium on its stability and moderation....and it is therefore important to consider the consequences of his departure.”

### Egypt-Israel: Sadat’s Policies

DI // Current Intelligence // 02 June 1978

“Egyptian President Sadat, by suggesting in a press interview on Tuesday that October would be a time of decision for his peace initiative, is trying to create a sense of urgency in order to revive the faltering negotiating process. Even so, Sadat’s statement does not appear to be just a tactical ploy, and he probably does intend to shift policies should no breakthrough in negotiations occur.”

### Israel: Political Pressures

DI // Current Intelligence // 03 June 1978

“Israeli Prime Minister Begin has come under new and contradictory political pressures from the rightwing Gush Emunim settlement organization and the moderate Democratic Movement for Change, reflecting these groups’ growing restiveness with his foreign policy.”

### Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 475

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 08 June 1978

“There is little doubt that the referendum in Egypt and its aftermath constitute a ‘deliberalization’ of the political scene. It is necessary however, to put recent events in historical perspective. It should be noted that strong rule by an authoritarian figure has been the norm throughout Egyptian history, with scarcely a trace of what could objectively be termed a ‘liberal tradition.’ In effect, the Egyptian tradition has been government by benevolent autocracy, with the democratic institutions of recent decades used primarily as a safety valve.... Sadat has done quite well in countering this authoritarian tradition until the last month.”

### Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 478

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 12 June 1978

“Syrian politicians over the past several weeks have increasingly discussed the impact of Sadat’s initiative on the peace process. Almost to the man, according to Embassy Damascus, they admit the positive effect Sadat’s initiative has had on American and Western European public opinion. The Arab world’s image has improved and Israel has been shown to be a ‘recalcitrant stumbling block’ to peace. Nevertheless, these Syrians are convinced that the Sadat initiative has been a step backward

from real peace. To the Syrians, more so than the other Arabs, the heart of the Middle East conflict remains the Palestinian question. According to the Syrians, neither Syria nor the US or any Middle Eastern state can bring peace to the area unless the Palestinians have a homeland.”

### Israel-Egypt: Debate on Negotiations

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 June 1978

“The Israeli cabinet remains divided over how to respond to US questions concerning eventual sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and arrangements for Palestinians in these areas to express their views. The next and perhaps conclusive cabinet debate on these issues will be held on Sunday. Prime Minister Begin may seek to rally support for some compromise formula.... President Sadat, for his part, is stressing the need for Israeli concessions but he is vague about what Egypt will do if these are not forthcoming.”

### Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 488

DI // Current Intelligence // 23 June 1978

“Sadat is facing severe problems in three principal policy areas — liberalization, economic reform, and his peace initiative.”

### Israel: Begin-Weizman Enmity

DI // Current Intelligence // 29 June 1978

“Weizman has become increasingly disillusioned with Begin’s and Dayan’s handling of negotiations with Egypt, and he fears that both have given up hope of reaching an accord with President Sadat. Weizman’s frustration flared last week after the cabinet voted to approve Begin’s vaguely worded response to US questions concerning the future of the West Bank. His sharp, intemperate criticism of Begin and Dayan was immediately replayed in the Israeli press, provoking a storm in some quarters of Likud and a call for his resignation from Minister of Commerce Hurwitz, a close supporter of Dayan.”

### Analysis of Arab Israeli Developments No. 494

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 30 June 1978

“Relations between Dayan and Weizman have reached a new low in recent days, following Weizman’s charge earlier during the debate on the US questions that Dayan was leading the Cabinet around by the nose and his allegation that Dayan and Begin were leading the country toward another war. On a more fundamental level, the problem between the two men derives from longstanding differences in policy perspectives, the continuing competition for succession to Begin, and intensified personal antagonism in the wake of Weizman’s harsh remarks two weeks ago.”

### Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 30 June 1978

“Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Weizman have temporarily papered over their sharp split in the recent Cabinet debate on policy toward the occupied West Bank, apparently at the strong urging of other leaders of the ruling coalition who fear an open break might precipitate a Cabinet crisis.”

### Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 514

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 22 July 1978

“On the Middle East aspects of the speech he [Sadat] criticized Begin as the ‘only obstacle’ to peace.”

### Egypt: Sadat and His Arab Critics

DI // Current Intelligence // 29 July 1978

“Egyptian President Sadat’s speech on Thursday was short on substance but did leave the door open to additional direct talks with Israel. Sadat’s statement should lay to rest recent speculation that a significant Arab reconciliation agreement was hammered out at the nonaligned meeting in Belgrade.”

### Sadat on 242

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 02 August 1978

“We are seeing increasing indications that, under strong pressure from the moderate Arab states and from within his own government, Sadat is finding it difficult to defend the continuation of his peace initiative and seems positioning himself for a shift in Egyptian policy.”

### Syria and the Peace Process

DI // Current Intelligence // 04 August 1978

“Assad considers the current stalemate as proof that his initial opposition to the Sadat initiative was correct. Last November, he predicted that Israel would not make any major concessions on the Palestinian issue and that Egypt would have to accept a separate deal with Israel or admit the error of its approach. Assad is convinced that it is only a matter of time until Sadat admits failure.”

### Discontent in Egypt and Syria, Memorandum for David Aaron from Gary Sick

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 07 August 1978

“[Less than one line redacted] Sadat is under pressure to produce some kind of concession or tangible evidence that his initiative has yielded results. Those pressures are mounting but are probably manageable at least for the moment. CIA and I both disagree with the suggestion in the State report that the continuation of the Sadat initiative will result in internal problems for the Syrians... In fact, my view would be that Sadat’s ‘failure’ has tended to vindicate Assad and lend some strength to him internally.”

### Egypt-Israel: Expectations

DI // Current Intelligence // 10 August 1978

“The reaction of Egyptian officials, military men, and intellectuals to the announcement of the tripartite meeting at Camp David next month has been overwhelmingly positive. The danger may be that expectations have been raised unrealistically high and that there could be a reaction against Egyptian President Sadat’s policies if the talks do not produce measureable progress. Public statements of Israeli officials reflect concern that the US will present a peace plan.”

## Middle East Developments, Memorandum for the Vice-President from Bill Quandt

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 13 August 1978

“Secretary Vance’s Trip: Both Begin and Sadat immediately accepted the President’s invitation to meet with him at Camp David. The talks are now scheduled to start on September 6, Begin will be accompanied by Dayan, Weizman, Yadin, and Barak, Sadat will bring Kamel, but we are not sure about Gamasy. We expect the talks to last about 3-5 days.”

### Presidential Visit to CIA Headquarters

CIA // Memorandum // 14 August 1978

Employee bulletin announcing President Carter’s visit to Headquarters on Wednesday, 16 August 1978.

### President Carter’s Remarks to Agency Employees

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 16 August 1978

“In the last number of years, the purpose of the CIA has been changing. Your assignment is different now from what it was. There was a time not too long ago when your almost unique responsibility was to assess the activities and the potential activities of the Soviet Union. That, obviously, is still one of the important assignments that you have. But now your duties extend to analysis of almost every region of the world, almost every country on Earth, our close allies and friends.”

### Saudi Arabia: Camp David Meeting

DI // Current Intelligence // 16 August 1978

“Saudi Arabia has been explaining its support for the trilateral talks at Camp David to key Arab leaders and trying to persuade them to withhold comment on the meeting between Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin until the outcome is known.”

### Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel

DI // Finished Intelligence // 17 August 1978

Leadership profile on Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

### Jordan and the Peace Negotiations

DI // Current Intelligence // 18 August 1978

“Hussein sees lack of movement on negotiations as posing a serious threat to the moderate Arab regimes. He believes a stalemate will discredit Sadat and possibly lead to the Egyptian leader’s overthrow, an event that would place severe pressure on moderate governments. Hussein shows little inclination, however, to move the negotiations along by offering to mediate on the West Bank and Palestinian issues that are the stumbling blocks.”

## Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s Perceptions of the Camp David Summit as of 18 August 1978

DO // Cable // 21 August 1978

“Attached for your information is a report [less than one line redacted] concerning Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s observations of the Camp David Summit in which he has expressed hope for the attainment of two separate but related



achievements. This information, known to very few Egyptian officials, is a raw report, not finally evaluated intelligence. The report is also being made available to the Secretary of State.

### Israel: Political Poll Results

DI // Current Intelligence // 22 August 1978

“A recent poll indicates that a significant majority of Israelis are satisfied with the Begin government’s efforts toward peace.”

### Moshe Dayan

DI // Finished Intelligence // 23 August 1978

Leadership profile on Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

### Anwar al-Sadat

DI // Finished Intelligence // 23 August 1978

Leadership profile on Egyptian President Sadat.

### Ezer Weizman

DI // Finished Intelligence // 24 August 1978

Leadership profile on Israel’s Minister of Defense.

### Personality Profiles of Sadat and Begin, Memorandum from DCI Turner to the President

DI // Finished Intelligence // 24 August 1978

“In response to your request for analyses of the personalities involved in the Middle East negotiations, I am sending you brief personality profiles of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.”

### Notes from the Director: President Carter’s Visit

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 28 August 1978

DCI Turner’s note to Agency employees sharing the President’s remarks.

### Preparations for 1 September National Security Council Meeting, Memorandum for the DCI from the Presidential Briefing Coordinator

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 29 August 1978

“In addition to backup material, it contains: draft talking points for a 5-7 minute presentation which attempts to: set the scene quickly of the history of Israel...State the views Begin and Sadat bring to the meeting... Discuss the consequences of failure.”

### Briefing Book - CIA Briefing Book Table of Contents

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

Includes cover, transmittal slip to National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and table of contents.

### Briefing Book - DCI Turner’s Cover Memo to the CIA Briefing Book

DCI/NIC // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

Memorandum for the President from DCI Turner.

### Strategy for Camp David, Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 31 August 1978

“For the talks at Camp David to succeed, you will have to control the proceedings from the outset and thereafter pursue a deliberate political strategy designed to bring about significant changes in both the Egyptian and Israeli substantive positions. I strongly suggest that you bear the following points in mind.”

### Briefing Book - Arab Reaction to a US Military Presence in the Middle East

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“Ever since the 1952 Egyptian Revolution the stationing of non-Arab troops in Arab countries has been anathema to all but the most conservative of Arab states. With the closure of the US communications facility in Morocco this year and the cosmetic change of the COMIDEASFOR ‘Base’ in Bahrain to a ‘porting facility,’ independent American military presence no longer exists in the Arab World, even in the conservative states. Non-alignment, positive neutrality, the Third World, anti-colonialism, etc. are the shibboleths on which the structure of modern Arab policy has been built.”

### Briefing Book - Camp David: The Consequences of Failure

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“The Camp David talks will have failed if: 1) The US is unable to persuade both Sadat and Begin to continue the present negotiating process...or 2) A breakdown at Camp David does not at least set in motion forces in Israel that could either cause Begin to moderate his position or lead to the collapse of his government.”

### Briefing Book - The Military Backdrop to Egyptian-Israeli Peace Negotiations

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“This paper begins with a brief overview of the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the current and likely future Arab-Israeli military balance. It outlines the military prospects of Egypt and Israel from the perspective of conservative military planners in each country. This ‘worst case’ perspective provides insights into the pressures on both Sadat and Begin to reach an agreement.”

### Briefing Book - Soviet Reaction to a US Military Presence in the Middle East

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“We have high confidence that Soviet reaction to even the prospect of a US military presence in the Middle East in any foreseeable context would be unreservedly and stridently negative.”

### Briefing Book - Israel-Egypt: Economic Benefits of Peace

DI // Briefing Book // 31 August 1978

“Any gains from a peace settlement would depend upon a substantial change in the siege mentality in both Israel and Egypt to a more optimistic view of the future.”

### National Security Council Meeting: Middle East - Camp David Summit

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 01 September 1978

“The President began the meeting by asking Ambassador Eilts and Ambassador Lewis to discuss briefly the personalities who would be with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin at Camp David.”

### Israel: New Public Opinion Poll

DI // Current Intelligence // 01 September 1978

“A recent telephone survey conducted by the Dahaf polling organization indicates that more than 60 percent of the Israeli public would support the return of some of the occupied West Bank if this would enable Israel to obtain an agreement with Egypt at Camp David.”

### Israel: Palestinian Terrorism

DI // Current Intelligence // 01 September 1978

“Palestinian terrorist groups have stepped up their operations in Israel and the occupied territories in accordance with plan[s] developed several months ago. Israeli security forces are able to counter most but not all of the terrorist operations, which have a new impetus as the Palestinians try to draw attention to their cause just prior to the Egyptian-Israeli-US summit talks to be held at Camp David next week.”

### Israel: Middle East Tensions Cloud Economic Outlook

DI // Current Intelligence // 07 September 1978

“This article assesses some of the economic trade-offs and potentialities of an open-border peace settlement and, alternatively, of an escalation in Middle East tensions.”

### Israel: Aftermath of Split in Democratic Movement for Change

DI // Finished Intelligence // 15 September 1978

“Two parties of equal parliamentary strength have formed in the wake of the split late last month in the Democratic Movement for Change, whose 15 Knesset seats made it the largest coalition partner of Prime Minister Begin’s ruling Likud bloc. The DMC rump, under former party head Yigael Yadin, will remain a member of Begin’s coalition, while the dovish breakaway group led by Amnon Rubinstein almost certainly will go over to the opposition—barring a major breakthrough in peace negotiations at Camp David.”

### CIA Operations Center: Afternoon Summary of News Highlights

DCI/NIC // Report // 18 September 1978

Report summarizing worldwide reactions to the Camp David talks.

### Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, Memorandum for the Record

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 20 September 1978

“I congratulated him on the success of the Summit. I asked what we could do to help from here. He indicated that we are trying to find ways to help Sadat survive. These are not to be symbolic actions but actions that would really be of support.”

### The Middle East in the Aftermath of Camp David

DI // Finished Intelligence // 20 September 1978

“The achievements of the Camp David summit surprised the Arab and Israeli publics and have caused considerable confusion and a mixture of negative and positive reactions. Our preliminary readings of the Egyptian and Israeli publics indicates that majorities support what their leaders have achieved; thus the prospect of either President Sadat or Prime Minister Begin facing an immediate domestic crisis seems highly remote.”

### Arab States: Reservations

DI // Current Intelligence // 20 September 1978

“Both Saudi Arabia and Jordan have expressed reservations about the outcome of the Camp David talks, while official Syrian reaction continues to be cautious. Reactions from Egypt are generally positive. The Palestinians are sharply attacking the accords. A summit of Arab hardliners is convening in Damascus today to discuss the situation.”

### Reactions to Camp David

DI // Current Intelligence // 21 September 1978

“A telephone survey by the Dahaf polling organization indicates that about 60 percent of the Israeli public approves abandoning Israel’s Sinai settlements as part of a peace agreement with Egypt. Barring a major Israeli-Egyptian dispute over interpretation, the US Embassy in Tel Aviv believes an overwhelming majority of Knesset deputies probably will vote in favor of the summit accords.”

### Syria: Steadfastness Front

DI // Current Intelligence // 22 September 1978

“Syrian President Assad is apparently trying to develop an Arab consensus to isolate Egyptian President Sadat. In his first public comments since the Camp David talks ended, Assad somberly criticized Sadat for abandoning the Arab cause and agreeing to a separate peace with Israel.”

### Israel: Dayan Smoothing the Way

DI // Current Intelligence // 22 September 1978

“Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan, in a television interview, has sought to minimize Israel’s concessions on the Palestinian issue—apparently to smooth the way for Knesset approval of the Camp David accords. His remarks reveal the tough stance Israel is likely to adopt once negotiations resume over the status of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as over the Golan Heights should Syria agree to hold talks.”



## Arab States: Steadfastness Summit

DI // Current Intelligence // 23 September 1978

“Hardline Arab states, led by Syria, stepped up their efforts yesterday to form a broad Arab consensus opposed to the Camp David agreements. Libyan leader Qadhafi and Palestine Liberation Organization chief Arafat interrupted the hardliners’ meeting in Damascus to meet with Jordan’s King Hussein in northern Jordan.”

## USSR: Reaction to Camp David

DI // Current Intelligence // 23 September 1978

“Soviet President Brezhnev in a speech in Baku yesterday firmly rejected the Camp David agreements, but stopped short of other inflammatory charges that Soviet media have recently raised against US Middle Eastern policy. In choosing to emphasize the points he did, however, Brezhnev gave no indication the USSR feels that either the tone or the substance of bilateral relations has improved in recent weeks.”

## Jordan: Hussein Buying Time

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 September 1978

“Jordan’s King Hussein is trying to pick his way through the dilemma into which he believes he was thrust by the Camp David framework for a Middle Eastern peace, which gave him a key role in the negotiating process. At the same time, he is being pressed by members of the Steadfastness Front, who are eager to bring him into their camp. Perhaps to buy time and to test the waters in Jordan, Hussein has set up a special working group on summit issues.”

## Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 570

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 25 September 1978

“Sadat has again proven his ability to read the mood of the average Egyptian. Hundreds of thousands turned out to greet and cheer him when he returned to Egypt....Embassy Cairo notes, however, that the crowds were somewhat smaller and relatively more subdued than those which welcomed him upon his return from Jerusalem.”

## Briefing Papers for Camp David, Memorandum for the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

DCI // Memorandum // 26 September 1978

“At the outset of my briefing with the President today, I congratulated him on Camp David. He replied that the briefing papers he received from CIA had been superb. He was particularly pleased with the profiles of the major leaders with whom he had to deal. He commented that based on his experience ‘you don’t need to change one word of the profiles.’”

## Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 571

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 26 September 1978

“The decision to combine the settlements issue with the vote on the Camp David framework and the Labor Party’s decision to support this single proposition, has assured Begin of what Maariv calls an ‘anguished victory’ in the Knesset.... Opposition to the accords is scattered; the loudest dissenters come from Begin’s own Likud bloc.”

## Egyptian Military Discontent

DI // Finished Intelligence // 26 September 1978

“We have received a steady stream of reports of discontent within the Egyptian armed forces, particularly within the officer corps, over the past couple of years. A number of reasons for the poor state of morale have been advanced.”

## Israel: Knesset Debate on Accords

DI // Current Intelligence // 27 September 1978

“Although Prime Minister Begin probably will easily win Knesset approval for the agreements he negotiated at Camp David, the margin may not be as large as first expected. There is uneasiness in almost all parties over the implications of the accords; much of the concern is focused on the agreement to dismantle the Sinai settlements.”

## Israel

DI // Current Intelligence // 29 September 1978

“The agreements negotiated at the Camp David summit, which the Israeli parliament approved on 28 September by a large majority, have given Prime Minister Begin’s popularity in the country as a whole a dramatic boost and further entrenched his government in power. Ironically, the adamant opposition of a vocal minority of ultra hardliners—especially to the required sacrifice of Jewish settlements in the Sinai—has weakened Begin’s support within the ruling coalition.”

## Palestinians: Terrorism

DI // Current Intelligence // 29 September 1978

“Radical Palestinian leaders such as George Habbash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, have publicly threatened to attack US targets abroad because of Washington’s role in arranging the Egyptian-Israeli agreements.”

## Israel: Politics After Vote

DI // Current Intelligence // 30 September 1978

“The Knesset’s approval of the Camp David accords is a major personal victory for Israeli Prime Minister Begin and a broadening of political support for his leadership on peace issues. Begin, however, paid a significant political price for his victory.”

## Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 575

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 30 September 1978

“The Camp David agreements and the criticism that they have aroused in the Arab world beyond Egyptian borders have subjected King Hussein to conflicting political pressures. Hussein seems inclined, for the moment at least, to lean in the direction of Damascus and Assad’s hardline response while keeping his options open.”

## Human Rights in the Middle East

DI // Current Intelligence // 02 October 1978

“[Less than one line redacted] most Middle East states perceived the U.S. policy on human rights as an unwarranted intrusion into their domestic affairs.”

## Palestinians: Position on Lebanon

DI // Current Intelligence // 03 October 1978

“Fatah leader Yasir Arafat apparently is opposed to an international conference on Lebanon. Palestinian forces have avoided involvement in the current upsurge of fighting in Lebanon, but significant Christian provocations could draw them in.”

## Egypt: Sadat’s New Prime Minister

DI // Current Intelligence // 03 October 1978

“Egyptian President Sadat’s detailed public defense yesterday of the agreements he signed at Camp David is likely to boost his stock further in Egypt. His naming of Dr. Mustafa Khalil as Prime Minister should impart a new sense of direction to a bureaucracy convinced since late July that Prime Minister Salim was on his way out.”

## Egypt: Reshaping the Government

DI // Current Intelligence // 04 October 1978

“Egypt’s announcement yesterday that War Minister Jamasi and Chief of Staff Fahmi have been removed from their posts is probably part of President Sadat’s reshaping of the government and preparations for implementing the Camp David accords, although the announcement was unusually abrupt.”

## Comments of King Hussein on his Perception of U.S. Pressure on Jordan to Join the Middle East Peace Negotiations and on his Recent Discussions with Saudi and Gulf Leaders

DO // Cable // 06 October 1978

“In King Hussein’s contacts with the United States, and in particular in three letters and one telephone call he has received from President Carter, Hussein has discerned the following theme: entering the negotiations is a difficult and risky course, but the King has taken risks in the past; furthermore, not getting involved holds far more risks. These and other messages—indicating that if Jordan ‘falls into line’ its military and economic needs will be satisfied—add up in the King’s mind to an implied threat.”

## Egypt

DI // Current Intelligence // 06 October 1978

“President Sadat named a new Prime Minister this week—the latest step in his continuing effort to reshape the Egyptian Government. Another major change was the dismissal of General Jamasi, as Minister of War and his probable removal from the team named to conduct negotiations with Israel in Washington next week.”

## Saudi Arabia: Peace Process

DI // Current Intelligence // 11 October 1978

“Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud has urged the US to find a way to open direct contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization and to link an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty with progress on resolving the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”

## Arab Summit

DI // Current Intelligence // 13 October 1978

“Iraq, whose dogmatic rejection of any negotiations with Israel has led to its isolation even from the hardline Arabs, is having some success pulling together an Arab summit conference in Baghdad to try to work out a coordinated opposition to the Camp David agreements.”

## Palestinians: Camp David Accords

DI // Current Intelligence // 14 October 1978

“Official statements by the Palestine Liberation Organization continue to contain harsh criticism of the Camp David accords. Some PLO leaders, however, are closely watching post-Camp David developments and ultimately may be willing to exploit quietly the opportunities the agreements offer the Palestinians.”

## Yasir Arafat’s Preference to Deal Directly with the United States Government rather than to Discuss a Middle East Peace with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat

DO // Cable // 20 October 1978

“Yasir Arafat conveyed a message to General Shawqat via an emissary on 12 October to the effect that he, Arafat, does not trust President Sadat and would prefer to deal directly with the United States (U.S.) on the matter of peace in the Middle East and the role of the PLO. Given the nature of the message, General Shawqat chose not to pass the message to President Sadat and instead sent his own emissary to contact Arafat for clarification of “Arafat’s precise views and desires.”

## Recommendations for United States Assistance to Egypt, Memorandum for the Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from DCI Stansfield Turner

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 24 October 1978

“He has made the following two suggestions for the support of the military sector, which would have the highly beneficial effect of ensuring the continued support of the Egyptian military during the peace process.”

## Israel-Egypt: Energy and the Sinai

DI // Current Intelligence // 24 October 1978

“The return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt will make Israel almost totally dependent on imported oil for its energy needs, at least for the next several years. Israel will probably try to negotiate access, at preferential prices, to some of the oil and gas it has discovered in the Sinai. Oil purchases from Egypt would save Israel money on transportation costs and would symbolize a major change in political relationships.”

## Israel: Current Negotiations

DI // Current Intelligence // 26 October 1978

“Despite the Israeli cabinet’s approval with changes of the draft peace treaty with Egypt, popular concern over the negotiating process continues. Israeli popular reaction to US Assistant Secretary of



State Saunders’ Middle East visit has been sharp and overwhelm- ingly critical, reflecting uneasiness over the Camp David accords and US intentions. To dampen these anxieties, Prime Minister Begin has sought to reassure the public and his coalition partners that the current negotiations will not be rushed to a hasty conclusion.”

### Egypt

DI // Current Intelligence // 27 October 1978

“President Sadat has dismissed two more members of his inner circle...the new ousters were abrupt; leaving the departing officials bitter. Ashraf Marwan, a close adviser and Sadat’s chief liaison to Saudi and Iranian leaders as well as the Egyptian head of the multinational corporation charged with building an Arab arms industry, was moved on 9 October to an unspecified job in Egypt’s Foreign Ministry.... The second victim was Sayid Mari, Speaker of the Peoples Assembly and for years one of Sadat’s most trusted advisers on domestic affairs.”

### Egypt: The Threat of Arab Sanctions

DI // Current Intelligence // 27 October 1978

“Economic sanctions against Egypt will almost certainly be considered at the Arab summit scheduled for next week. Saudi Arabia, whose participation would be necessary for effective sanctions, is trying to head off such a move.”

### Arab States: Summit Meeting

DI // Current Intelligence // 28 October 1978

“Developments in the Middle East during the past few days have lessened the likelihood of a major quarrel erupting between Arab hardliners and moderates when they meet in Baghdad next week to talk about the Camp David accords. The successful conclu- sion of reconciliation talks between Iraq and Syria this week, Israel’s decision to ‘thicken’ West Bank settlements, and specu- lation about a move of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the Office of the Prime Minister to East Jerusalem have bolstered the hand of the hardliners and made it harder for Saudi Arabia and other moderates to blunt anti-Egyptian measures. The moderate tone of the communiqué issued following the Iraqi-Syrian talks sug- gests, however, that an effort will be made at Baghdad to come up with proposals acceptable to all the conferees.”

### Arab States: Summit Strategies

DI // Current Intelligence // 02 November 1978

“The Arab foreign ministers conference in Baghdad ended yesterday with agreement on ‘middle-of-the-road’ proposals, according to Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud. The draft proposals will be considered by the Arab summit, scheduled to open today in Baghdad.”

### Arab Summit

DI // Current Intelligence // 03 November 1978

“The Arab world beyond Egypt is still reverberating from the impact of the Camp David accords and the prospect of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Late this week, Arab heads of state began meeting in Iraq—with Egypt unrepresented—to formulate a joint stand toward the accords and toward Egyptian President Sadat.”

### Arab States: Summit Meeting

DI // Current Intelligence // 06 November 1978

“The final communiqué issued yesterday at the end of the Arab summit in Baghdad noted the dangers of defection from Arab ranks but stopped short of openly condemning Egyptian President Sadat.”

### Arab States

DI // Current Intelligence // 09 November 1978

“The political damage to Sadat is mostly symbolic. Egypt becomes increasingly isolated in the Arab world. The Baghdad summit was the first major Arab meeting ever held without Egyptian representation, and the removal of Arab League headquarters from Cairo—if imple- mented—will further strengthen the image of an ostracized Egypt.”

### Egypt: Sadat’s Political Changes

DI // Current Intelligence // 09 November 1978

“Egyptian President Sadat has made drastic changes in his inner circle of advisers, his Cabinet and the country’s grass-roots polit- ical structure since last spring. The cumulative effect of these actions has been a retreat from Sadat’s political liberalization program, greater concentration of authority in the President’s office, [two lines redacted].”

### Egypt-Saudi Arabia

DI // Current Intelligence // 17 November 1978

“Strong personal criticism of Saudi leaders by Egyptian Presi- dent Sadat since the Baghdad summit early this month threatens to bring relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia to the lowest point since Sadat took power in 1970.”

### Worst Case Scenarios in the Middle East

NSC/WH/STATE // Memorandum // 24 November 1978

“The purpose of this paper is to look, as requested, at ‘worst case’ scenarios for the Middle East, the implications for the U.S. in such situations, and what we could do about them. The following possibilities strike us as the likeliest contingencies that we need to consider: Sadat signs a Treaty that the other Arabs see as a sell-out; they mobilize against him...Sadat is forced from office and replaced...Alternatively, the Egypt-Israel Treaty negotiations fail...The Shah is overthrown and is replaced...From any of the above causes there is instability in Saudi Arabia...The tenuous cease-fire in Lebanon breaks down...There is a leftist coup in North Yemen which the Soviets support.... Any of these can happen; indeed two or more could happen at the same time. But the cause and effect relationship between them varies from the immediate to the tenuous. We see no ‘cascade’ effect as between events in Iran and developments in the Arab-Israel arena.... Even the connection between Lebanon and the Arab-Is- rael negotiations should not be exaggerated.”

### Israel: Arab Trends after Baghdad

DI // Current Intelligence // 29 November 1978

“Analysts of Israel’s Foreign and Defense Ministries attribute the stiffening in Egyptian President Sadat’s negotiating position

on the linkage question primarily to his chagrin over the results of the Baghdad summit. Nevertheless, the Israelis do not expect that Arab opposition will deter Sadat from concluding a peace treaty and content that his room for maneuver has not been seriously affected.”

### Arab States-Israel: Treaty

DI // Current Intelligence // 19 December 1978

“Egyptians are reacting to the missed deadline for an Egyp- tian-Israeli treaty by emphasizing the difference between the US and Israel and trying to portray the US position as completely in accord with Egypt’s. In Israel, there has been an outpouring of criticism of US negotiating tactics from all sides. Official reaction from other Middle East governments has been sparse, but the general mood among them is one of relief that they, at least temporarily, do not have to face a signed treaty.”

### Israel: Pressure for Settlements

DI // Current Intelligence // 20 December 1978

“Leaders of the Israeli radical nationalist Gush Emunim organi- zation, which is dedicated to settling more Jews on the occupied West Bank, are threatening to ‘create new facts’ by establishing unsanctioned new settlements there unless the government officially approves additional settlements soon. Prime Minister Begin reportedly has not made up his mind on the settlements issue, although he probably would prefer to defer any action in order to avoid jeopardizing peace negotiations and worsening relations with the US.”

### Syria-Iraq: A Temporary Alliance

DI // Current Intelligence // 25 January 1979

“The three-month-old rapprochement between Syria and Iraq is the product of mutual concern over the Israeli-Egyptian peace process and the upheaval in Iran as well as the narrow tactical consid- erations of each side. Although a ‘unity’ scheme between these two traditional rivals may come soon, it will be fragile and superficial. Both governments are deeply suspicious of each other and have rival pretensions for leadership in the eastern Arab world. ”

### Individual and Group Influences on the Decision- making of Key Palestinian Organizations

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 February 1979

32-page research paper on key Palestinian decision makers. Covers the Palestine Liberation Organization’s structure and decision-mak- ing process and research on Palestinian commando groups affil- iated with the PLO including: Fatah, Saiqa, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Reaction Front.

### Implications of Iran for Middle East Peace Negotiations

DI // Finished Intelligence // 16 February 1979

“The collapse of the Shah’s regime and the current uncertain situation in Iran have, along with a host of other factors, caused Israel and Egypt to strike more rigid positions on key unresolved issues in peace negotiations. Although the upheaval in Iran has directly affected only one issue—Israel’s desire to secure oil

supplies from Egyptian fields in the Sinai—it has caused both sides to reconsider their approaches to negotiations in light of broader concerns.”

### Israel-Egypt: Domestic Climate and Negotiations

DI // Current Intelligence // 21 February 1979

“Domestic pressures in Egypt and Israel on the eve of the new talks at Camp David will encourage both sides to maintain tough negotiating positions. A campaign by Israeli hardliners to force Prime Minister Begin to modify the autonomy plan for the West Bank and Gaza Strip that he agreed to last September has reduced Foreign Minister Dayan’s already limited room for maneuver.”

### Possible Arab Acceptance of an Egyptian-Israeli Treaty

DI // Finished Intelligence // 27 February 1979

“The White House suggestion that the Arabs would accept a treaty if presented with a fait accompli may have been prompted by two statements made during Secretary Brown’s recent visit to the Middle East. The Secretary told Sadat that he had found the Saudis less critical of the Camp David Accords in private than in public, and that King Husayn was ‘less intent’ on pursuing the issues at the UN or Geneva. Sadat, during his conversation with Brown, said that all Arabs but the ‘rejectionists’ (presumably Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen) and Kuwait (because of its large Palestinian population) would accept a treaty.”

### Arab Reactions

DI // Finished Intelligence // 15 March 1979

“Arab renunciation of President Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is building toward a crescendo. We expect the effort by Iraq, Syria, and Libya to stampede the more moderate Arabs into unqualified condemnation of the treaty to be largely successful.”

### [Less than one line redacted]Fatah Leader Yasir Arafat. Memorandum for the Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of State from Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 15 March 1979

“Arafat then asks the following questions on the current peace talks: a) Is it true that the U.S. has agreed to guarantee that Israel will receive its needed oil supplies, at OPEC prices, from either Egypt or the U.S.? B) Is it true that the U.S. is handling the issue of Egypt’s defense pacts with other Arab states by obtaining a specific Israeli guarantee not to attack Syria or Jordan?... Is it true that the U.S. will agree to a clause making any ‘self-rule’ timetable contingent upon ‘cooperation’ by the inhabitants of the occupied territories?”

### USSR: Views on Egyptian-Israeli Treaty

DI // Current Intelligence // 28 March 1979

“The Soviets in their initial reaction to the signing of the Egyp- tian-Israeli peace treaty reiterated their charges that the US intends to establish a military presence in the Middle East. Mos- cow continues to focus on alleged US plans for regional security alliances and the stationing of military advisers in Egypt and Israel to ‘compensate for the loss of Iran and the collapse of CENTO.”



Arab States: Split at Baghdad Conference

DI // Current Intelligence // 30 March 1979

“The conference in Baghdad where Arab Foreign Ministers have been discussing measures against Egypt since Tuesday is bogged down by sharp differences between moderates and hardliners, (less than one line declassified).”

Sadat’s Liberalization Policy

DI // Finished Intelligence // 01 June 1979

“Egypt is in the midst of an election campaign precipitated by President Sadat to rid the People’s Assembly of the most vocal critics of the peace treaty with Israel. The situation dramatizes Sadat’s paradoxical approach to liberalizing politics in Egypt. On the one hand, he has been responsible for unquestionable progress in moving Egypt away from authoritarian government and closer to Western-style democracy.... On the other hand, the parties Sadat encourages...differ only slightly, while those offering real alternatives are barely tolerated.”

Personality Profiles in Support of the Camp David Summit

Studies in Intelligence // Article // 01 June 1979

“Among the briefing materials President Carter carried to Camp David for his historic meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in September 1978 were a personality profile on each of the two Middle Eastern leaders and a third profile comparing their personalities and negotiating style. Following his diplomatic triumph, the President conveyed his appreciation to the Central Intelligence Agency for the intelligence support provided him and singled out the personality profiles for special praise: ‘After spending 13 days with the two principals,’ he said, ‘I wouldn’t change a word.’”

Middle East Peace Negotiations

DI // Finished Intelligence // 31 July 1979

“Our analysis of the current autonomy negotiations leads us to believe that there is an increasingly urgent need to attract Pales- tinian interest in participation. The attached paper provides our assessment of the forces at work on the principal players.”

Syria: Assad’s Prospects

DI // Finished Intelligence // 17 March 1980

“President Assad has committed his minority Alawite government to a risky course with his reported decision to use the military more freely to crush civil unrest in Syrian cities. This may intimid- ate his domestic opponents in the short run, but unless Assad is able to reestablish order quickly, it will also further erode his domestic support and could eventually bring about his ouster.”

Syria, Memorandum for the National Security Council from Frank C. Carlucci

DCI/NIC // Memorandum // 11 July 1980

“Although not imminent, Syrian President Assad’s assassination or overthrow is significantly more likely today than it was before the 26 June assassination attempt. I believe that US policymakers need to focus sooner rather than later on the potential adverse regional consequences of Assad’s removal from the scene.”

Speaker Biographies



Jimmy Carter. (Courtesy: Library of Congress)



## JIMMY CARTER

39th President of the United States

Jimmy Carter was thirty-ninth president of the United States, serving from January 20, 1977 to January 20, 1981. Significant foreign policy accomplishments of his administration included the Panama Canal treaties, the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union, and the establishment of U.S. diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. He championed human rights throughout the world. On the domestic side, the administration's achievements included a comprehensive energy program conducted by a new Department of Energy; deregulation in energy, transportation, communications, and finance; major educational programs under a new Department of Education; and major environmental protection legislation, including the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.

His determination to pursue peace in the Middle East led him to bring together the leaders of Israel and Egypt at Camp David in 1978. After thirteen days of difficult negotiations, the Camp David Accords were signed, providing a framework for resolving the conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Six months later came

the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt. Agreements with other antagonists were not achieved at this time, but, after leaving office, President Carter would continue to pursue the goal of comprehensive peace in the region.

Of President Carter's twenty-seven books, nine give significant attention to issues of the Middle East. *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (1982) provides a detailed account of negotiations during his administration. *We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work* (2009) provides a blueprint for the future.

In 1982, President Carter became University Distinguished Professor at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, and founded The Carter Center. The nonpartisan and nonprofit Center strives to resolve conflict, promote democracy, protect human rights, and prevent disease and other afflictions.

On December 10, 2002, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2002 to Mr. Carter "for his decades of untiring effort to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts, to advance democracy and human rights, and to promote economic and social development."

## WILLIAM B. QUANDT

Edward R. Stettinius Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia and former senior staff member, National Security Council

William B. Quandt is the Edward R. Stettinius, Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. He has been a member of the Department of Politics since 1994, and from 2000 to 2003 has also served as Vice Provost for International Affairs for the University. He teaches courses on the Middle East and American Foreign Policy. Prior to this appointment, he was a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, where he conducted research on the Middle East, American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and energy policy.

Before going to Brookings in 1979, Dr. Quandt served as a staff member on the National Security Council (1972-1974, 1977-1979). He was actively involved in the negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Dr. Quandt was also an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, worked at the Rand Corporation in the Department of Social Science from 1968-1972, and taught at UCLA and MIT.

## JERROLD POST

Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs and Director of the Political Psychology Program at The George Washington University.

Dr. Jerrold Post has devoted his entire career to the field of political psychology. Dr. Post came to George Washington after a 21-year career with the Central Intelligence Agency where he founded and directed the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, an interdisciplinary behavioral science unit which provided assessments of foreign leadership and decision making for the President and other senior officials to prepare for Summit meetings and other high level negotiations and for use in crisis situations. He played the lead role in developing the "Camp David profiles" of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat for President Jimmy Carter and initiated the U.S. government program in understanding the psychology of terrorism. In recognition of his leadership of the Center, Dr. Post was awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit in 1979, and received the Studies in Intelligence Award in 1980. He received the Nevitt Sanford Award for Distinguished Professional Contributions to Political Psychology in 2002.

Dr. Post has published widely on crisis decision-making, leadership, and on the psychology of political violence and terrorism, and recently has been addressing weapons of mass destruction terrorism: psychological incentives and constraints, as well as information systems terrorism. He is the co-author of a study of the politics of illness in high office, *When Illness Strikes the Leader: The Dilemma of the Captive King*, Yale University Press, 1993, and *Political Paranoia: The Psycho-politics of Hatred*, Yale, 1997. His other books include: *The Psychological Evaluation of Political Leaders, With profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (University of Michigan Press, 2003); with Barry Schneider, *Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and their Strategic Cultures* (Air Force Counter Proliferation Center, 2003); *Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior* (Cornell University Press, 2004); and his most recent book *The Mind of a Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

## MARTHA NEFF KESSLER

Former CIA analyst on the Middle East and South Asia

Martha Neff Kessler was an intelligence officer with the CIA from 1970 to 2000, working on the Middle East, South Asia, and terrorism. She held positions throughout the Directorate of Intelligence and served three times on the National Intelligence Council as the Director of CIA's point person on the Middle East. For six years, she headed the Arab-Israeli Division and was liaison with US peace negotiators throughout the Madrid peace process. She was a fellow at the National Defense University's War College where she published *Syria: A Fragile Mosaic of Power*. Martha was a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution where she contributed to the Middle Foreign Policy Journal. During her career, she was awarded the CIA's Medal of Distinguished Service and the National Intelligence Community's Medal of Achievement. She received numerous Outstanding Performance Awards during crises in Lebanon, the Gulf War, and the Iraq war and was also honored for her authorship of National Intelligence Estimates on the rise of religious extremism.



Anchor and Correspondent, CNN International

His international news coverage portfolio includes the release of Nelson Mandela from prison; the fall of the Berlin Wall; the last days of apartheid in South Africa; the September 11th terrorist attacks; the war in Iraq; the sex scandal in the U.S. Catholic Church; and the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006. In addition, Mann travels to Oslo, Norway each December for "The Prize for Peace," a special program focused on the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Previously, Mann worked as an anchor on CNN's U.S. network for a variety of weekend and prime-time weeknight programs. Before his duties as an anchor, Mann was CNN's first Paris correspondent.

General Editor of the Foreign Relations of the US series, Department of State's Office of the Historian

CIA Historian

## NOTES

[illegible]



[illegible]





The Historical Review Program—part of CIA Information Management Services—identifies, collects, and produces historically significant collections of declassified documents.

These collections, centered on a theme or event, are supplemented with supporting analysis, essays, and photographs, showcased in this booklet. Additional booklets are available for purchase through the Government Printing Office at <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/1581>. Each collection is also highlighted through an accompanying microsite that includes: video, audio, additional photographs, and links to declassified documents. These microsites can be found at <https://foia.cia.gov>.

All of our Historical Collections are available on the CIA Library Publication page located at:

<https://www.cia.gov/libray/publications/historical-collection-publications>.



USE MOBILE DEVICE TO SCAN

